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I. INTRODUCTION
The nations of the world have become increasingly interdepen-
dent; trade agreements, private business ventures, and a host of
other arrangements indicate the continuous and complex interac-
tion of governments and individuals across national boundaries.
Although a great deal of attention often is placed upon the initial
agreements, far less consideration is given to the problem of what
happens when differences occur and agreements are broken. More
specifically, there has been insufficient critical attention directed
toward the type of evidence which will be available to a litigant
when questions arise concerning international transactions. As an
illustration, suppose a businessman from the United States agreed
to have a French company supply him with needed equipment. If
the French firm breaches the agreement and the American brings
a civil suit in the United States, it is crucial to know what
evidence or testimony can be obtained from the French company
and its officials who are nationals of France. This article examines
the practical considerations involved and the legal framework to
be utilized in obtaining evidence abroad.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, an in-depth review
is presented of the law applicable to litigants who bring a civil
case in the United States and seek to obtain foreign source
evidence. The relevant procedure under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, as well as the guidelines provided by the Hague Con-
vention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, is examined.' Second, In Re Westinghouse Uranium Con-
tract Litigation' is examined; a case in which the defendant,
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Mat-
ters, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781
(1976), 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 37 (1969), and 6 MARTINDALE-HUBBLE LAW DICTIONARY 4.294
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Evidence Convention]. The Evidence Convention was adopted at
the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, October 26,
1968. It was opened for signature in 1970. Currently, the Evidence Convention has been
ratified by seven countries: Denmark, France, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Eighteen other countries are signatories to the Conven-
tion, but thus far they have not ratified it. Note also that non-signatory countries may
specifically accede to the Convention should they desire to do so.
' In re Westinghouse Uranium Contract Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 316 (1975). The suit was
brought by thirteen utility companies against Westinghouse for breach of contract, when
Westinghouse failed to supply uranium fuel to the utilities under its contractual com-
mitments. As a defense Westinghouse asserted that a cartel had driven the price of
uranium up, and therefore, based on the commercial impracticibility doctrine of § 2-615 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, it was excused from honoring the contracts with the utility
companies. In an effort to substantiate its defense, Westinghouse sought evidence from a
British corporation, Rio Tinto Zinc, Ltd. Westinghouse wanted to take the oral testimony of
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Westinghouse Electric Corporation, attempted to utilize the pro-
visions of the Evidence Convention to obtain evidence from
several British subjects. Several elements of the case are discussed,
including: the procedures utilized by Westinghouse, the reaction
of the British subjects to the request for evidence, the role of the
U.S. government and the decisions of the British courts regarding
the issue of providing judicial assistance to the American court. In
this discussion, some of the important implications of the Conven-
tion are assessed.
The Hague Evidence Convention is the culmination of extensive
efforts to simplify and expedite the process of international
judicial assistance.3 The results of this effort reflect the current
several RTZ company executives and to obtain certain documentary evidence from the
British corporation which had participated in the cartel to drive up uranium prices. After a
year in the British lower courts, the matter was resolved by Britian's highest court, the
House of Lords (In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contract Litigation,
1978 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977)). For a discussion of the Westinghouse litigation, see generally
Merhige, The Westinghouse Uranium Case: Problems Encountered in Seeking Foreign
Discovery and Evidence, 13 INT'L LAW. 19 (1979). See also Westbrook, Obtaining Evidence
for International Litigation in American Courts, 11 LAW. OF THE AMERICAS 397 (1979).
' The term "international judicial assistance" includes both the service of documents in
foreign states and obtaining evidence in foreign states. Sometimes the term is used to
describe a number of topics such as extradition, execution of foreign judgments, and other
areas of judicial action. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION PRACTICE
MANUAL, VOLUME 1, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE. §§ 3-12.1 to 3-12.32 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as PRACTICE MANUAL].
It is important for the practitioner to distinguish the Hague Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial Documents, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S.
163, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. FED. R. CIV. P., 6 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4285
(1976), from the Hague Evidence Convention, which is the topic of this paper. The Service
Convention provides for the service of judicial documents in civil or commercial matters
among the eighteen countries that have ratified that agreement. PRACTICE MANUAL at 6.
The Service Convention was the first accomplishment of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, which studied and sought to resolve the problems of interna-
tional judicial assistance. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 836 (2d
ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as STEINER & VAGTS]. Following the success of the Service Con-
vention as an aid in resolving private international litigation, the United States proposed
that the Hague Conference on Private International Law consider the revision and modern-
ization of procedures for taking evidence in foreign countries. Report of the United States
Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 804-05 (1969). [hereinafter cited as U.S. Report on the Hague Con-
ference]. Thus, the Service Convention was a prelude to the more difficult problem of
establishing an international procedure for the obtaining of evidence abroad. The Service
Convention is currently in effect in 18 countries: Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Denmark,
Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. PRACTICE MANUAL at 7.
Under the terms of the Service Convention, an American attorney who seeks to serve a
person in one of the countries that has ratified the Convention can send the necessary
documents to the central authority in that country. The central authority is the governmen-
tal unit authorized to process the service of the documents. A list of the appropriate central
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level of international cooperation through which the courts of one
country can obtain needed evidence from another country in order
to pursue their own adjudicative process. Although the Conven-
tion has limitations, it is presently the best international
mechanism for American litigants to obtain evidence in those
countries which have ratified the agreement.' The Westinghouse
authorities, as well as a list of the reservations and declarations made by each country to
the Service Convention, is printed in the annotation to FED. R. CIv. P. 4(i). The names and
addresses of the central authorities can be found in Appendix D to Department of Justice
Memo No. 386, Revision 1, July 1, 1973, on file in the U.S. Attorney's and U.S. Marshall's of-
fices. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3. See also Carl, Service of Judicial Documents in
Latin America, 53 DEN. L. J. 455 (1976). Additional consideration of the procedure for serv-
ing documents abroad is beyond the scope of this article. Such procedure is, however, an
important adjunct to the taking of evidence procedure, and the above mentioned sources
should provide an indication of when and how service abroad can be accomplished by
counsel for U.S. litigants. Furthermore, the number of countries which have ratified the
Service Convention may be an indication of eventual further ratification of the Evidence
Convention, which has thus far been ratified by seven countries.
' Proceeding under the Evidence Convention is more satisfactory than other methods of
obtaining evidence abroad because it is a standardized procedure which removes much
uncertainty from the effort. The Evidence Convention is not the most liberal procedure in
effect for obtaining evidence within a country. For example, the judicial assistance statute
of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1976), is much more liberal. Of course, the U.S. law
applies whenever litigants from foreign countries seek to obtain evidence within the U.S.
While detailed analysis of the United States procedures for allowing foreign litigants to ob-
tain evidence here is beyond the scope of this paper, several important details should at
least be mentioned to provide a basis for comparing the reverse process of American
litigants seeking evidence abroad.
Foreign courts can obtain evidence in the U.S. "with greater facility than can our courts
in the converse situtation." In fact, our courts have the power to extend international
judicial assistance to foreign courts despite the lack of any reciprocity. PRACTICE MANUAL,
supra note 2, at 53. See In re Request for Judicial Assistance from the Second District
Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea, 428 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.
1977). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 applies to criminal as well as civil matters for which
evidence is sought. By comparison, the Evidence Convention only applies to obtaining
evidence in civil or commercial matters. This is a key difference which precludes American
courts obtaining substantial international judicial assistance in criminal matters. For cases
which involve the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to obtain evidence for a criminal proceeding in
another country see In re Letters Rogatory from the Justice Court, Dist. of Montreal,
Canada, 383 F. Supp. 857 (D.C. Mich. 1974), affd, 523 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1975). Accord, In re
Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976). See
also 13 Hous. L. R. 423 (1976); 18 HARV. INT'L L. J. 460 (1977); 12 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 105 (1977).
An additional indication of section 1782's more liberalized view of international judicial
assistance is that federal courts will recognize requests for assistance not only from foreign
courts, but also from "tribunals." The term "tribunals" has been broadly interpreted to in-
clude a public prosecutor, see In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo District, Tokyo,
Japan, supra, but not a Canadian Commission of Inquiry, In re Letters of Request to Ex-
amine Witnesses from the Court of Queen's Bench for Manitoba, Canada, 59 F.R.D. 625
(N.D. Cal. 1973). However, the purpose of using the word "tribunal" in Section 1782 was to
broaden the applicability of the provision to proceedings not only before conventional
courts, but also before "investigating magistrates" in foreign countries. REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1963). As long as the re-
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case is a good example of some of the problems which arise in ob-
taining foreign source evidence. It is the author's contention that
the problems which arose in that case possibly are due in part to
the complexities surrounding international notions of comity' and
questing body serves a judicial or quasi-judicial function, American judicial assistance
should be forthcoming if it is requested under section 1782. In re Letters Rogatory from
the Tokyo District, supra at 1218. The Evidence Convention similarly uses the term judicial
authority. See note 135, infra. See also 9 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 108 (1974).
Finally, section 1782 provides for the assertion of a privilege by any person from whom
testimony is sought. Obviously, a legally applicable privilege in the U.S. would be the self-
incrimination privilege of the fifth amendment. For example, In re Letters Rogatory from
the Tokyo District, supra, involved a claim of fifth amendment privilege by three former
Lockheed officials whose testimony was taken under a letter of request from the Japanese
prosecutor. The U.S. district court judge recognized the privilege and refused to release
any depositions until a grant of immunity from criminal prosecution was issued by the
Japanese government. Once such immunity was granted, the testimony was released. 18
HARV. INT'L L. J. 460 (1977). The privileges which a witness can invoke in the face of a
foreign court's request for judicial assistance is critically important. In fact, in the
Westinghouse case the assertion of two privileges (one based upon English law; the other
based on the fifth amendment) had the effect of precluding the acquisition of testimony
from the British subjects. See text at notes 46-64 infra. See also the Evidence Convention's
provisions regarding privilege, text at note 161, infra.
For a general review of section 1782, including the legislative history of the liberalization
of American procedure for honoring requests for judicial assistance, see Smit, International
Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015 (1965); Smit, Interna-
tional Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1031 (1961); and 6 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 211-16 (1968).
For the exact procedure to be followed in utilizing section 1782 for obtaining evidence in
the U.S., see PRACTICE MANUAL § 3-12.19, supra note 3, at 53-64. See also Pub. L. No.
88-619, 78 Stat. 995 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1781-85) and the legislative history at [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3782.
' Comity is defined as courtesy . . . [and] respect .... that body of rules which states
observe towards one another from courtesy or mutual convenience, although [it] does not
form a part of international law. [Comity] is derived altogether from the voluntary consent
of the [other nation]; and it is inadmissible when it is contrary to its known policy, or prej-
udicial to its interests. In the silence of any rule affirming or denying or restraining the
operation of foreign laws, courts of justice presume the tacit adoption of [such laws] by
their own government, unless repugnant to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests....
[Comity in the lephl sense is] . .. [tlhe recognition which one nation allows within its ter-
ritory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 334 (4th ed.
1968).
"Comity is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
or good will, upon the other." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-4 (1894). See generally J.
STORY. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2nd ed. 1841); R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE &
H. KAY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS, 1-8 (2d ed. 1975).
The U.S. government honors letters of request received by the Department of State
under 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a)(1) (1976) in its discretion ". . . on the basis of international courtesy
and comity." However, requests "under the Hague Evidence Convention . .-. must be ex-
ecuted as a result of a treaty obligation assumed by the United States." PRACTICE MANUAL,
supra note 3, at 56-57 (Emphasis added). This distinction between the obligations of a coun-
try based upon comity or upon a treaty obligation can be crucial in determining the action
to be provided upon receipt of a letter of request. See text at note 157, infra.
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in part to the limits on the reach of American courts, rather than
to the limits of the Convention itself. These limits may be
especially important in cases involving U.S. antitrust law or the
regulations of the Federal Maritime Commission.' Generally
speaking, the limitations on the effective use of the Convention,
such as those imposed by the British courts, are not likely to arise
in the more common cases where government policy issues do not
stand as impediments. In such cases, the Convention will no doubt
be a very useful tool for obtaining evidence.7
It is hoped that the review of the Westinghouse case, though it
is perhaps an extraordinary one, will serve to identify some
elements of the interaction between foreign and domestic laws
when the Evidence Convention is utilized.8 In addition, the case
See note 236, infra. The existence of antitrust law elements in the Westinghouse case
makes it more complex than what might ordinarily arise between two private litigants. In
the easier case, usually it is two non-governmental parties which are trying to resolve their
differences. However, in the Westinghouse litigation the evidence which was being sought
by Westinghouse would also be useful, if not essential, to an investigation being conducted
by the Justice Department into antitrust violations by the uranium cartel and a federal
grand jury proceeding with the same purpose. The action of the Department of Justice in
regard to the Westinghouse case, discussed infra at notes 242-276, adds an important
dimension to the case which adversely affected the willingness of the British courts to
grant Westinghouse's request for evidence from the British subjects. It will be seen,
however, that the Justice Department had little choice but to become even further involved
in the matter when the British subjects claimed the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, and a grant of immunity was required to obtain any testimony from them.
See note 248, infra.
The Evidence Convention establishes specific procedures for obtaining evidence from
another country. It allows litigants "to obtain evidence abroad for use in judicial pro-
ceedings, commenced or contemplated without the need to proceed through the time con-
suming and uncertain diplomatic channel." PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 25.
' For example, the Evidence Convention provides that a court within the country which
is requested to execute a letter of request (ie., the executing country) "shall apply its own
law as to the methods and procedure to be followed. However, [the executing country can
comply with] a request for the requesting authority that a special method or procedure be
followed, unless this is incompatible with the internal law of the state of execution .. "
Evidence Convention, supra note 1, Article 9. In Article 10, the Convention provides that
the state of execution "shall apply the appropriate measure of compulsion... [to require
testimony and to the same extent as] provided by its internal law for the execution of re-
quests made by parties in internal proceedings." Because of these provisions and Article 11
which allows a witness to assert any privilege to refuse to provide evidence under the law
of either the state of execution or the requesting state, substantial conflicts may easily
arise between the foreign law of the requesting state and the domestic law of the state of
execution. The ultimate resolution of such conflicts in a particular case will have a con-
clusive effect on the availability or non-availability of the evidence being sought. For a
detailed discussion of this problem'see the text at notes 142-158, infra.
A complete evaluation of all applicable foreign internal law relating to honoring requests
of other countries desiring to obtain evidence in a particular country is beyond the scope of
this paper. In regard to the Westinghouse case, however, there will be an analysis of the in-
ternal law of Great Britain and its application to an attempt to secure evidence in that coun-
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places the Evidence Convention in perspective; the Convention ac-
complishes a great deal but cannot unravel some of the complex
issues of sovereignty and comity9 which may arise in any litigation
having international aspects.
With these general thoughts in mind, the elements which make
up the mosaic of international judicial assistance available to
United States litigants can be reviewed.
II. OBTAINING EVIDENCE ABROAD WHEN THERE
IS NO TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
FOREIGN COUNTRY
Before looking at the Evidence Convention, it is important to
review briefly some other methods which may be used to obtain
evidence abroad."0 These methods will be used in the absence of
any specific agreement" such as the Evidence Convention or other
applicable treaty or international agreement."
As with requests under the Hague Service Convention,"
several factors will influence the method to be used in obtaining
evidence from within another country. Key considerations 4 are:
try. Furthermore, the paper will indicate some of the significant difficulties in obtaining
evidence which result from the internal law requirements of various countries. It is hoped
that such discussion will provide a starting point for further inquiry into the implications of
the executing state's internal law upon the ability of a foreign litigant to obtain evidence in
that country. It is also important to keep in mind that the differences between the pro-
cedures followed by civil law countries may be much greater than those between the Anglo
and American systems. In any event, the inherent difficulties indicate that obtaining
foreign counsel would be a prudent course of action. See notes 19 and 21 infra. See generally
STEINER & VAGTS supra note 3, at 835-37 and INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN LITIGATION:
EUROPE (Smit ed. 1965).
See note 5 supra.
20 There are some important limitations to utilization of the Evidence Convention:
(a) it applies only to civil or commercial matters and not to criminal matters
(Article 1); and
(b) it is operative only among the states which have ratified it. See note 1 supra.
I, Many of the Justice Department's "requirements for foreign source evidence arise in
connection with criminal cases involving countries with which no mutual assistance
agreements are in force." PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 33. Apparently, the only
agreement negotiated by the U.S. in this area as of 1973 was the Treaty with the Swiss
Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. This treaty entered into force in
January 1977. Reprinted in SEN. EXEC. F., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) and 12 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'LS 916 (1973).
12 For example, the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory applies to serving
documents and to taking evidence abroad. This agreement was adopted by the Organization
of American States and is open to adherence by member states as well as by nations who
are not O.A.S. members. O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. A/21 (SEDF). Carl, Service of Judicial
Documents in Latin America, 53 DEN. L. J. 455, 457-58 (1976).
23 See note 3 supra.
14 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 33-34. These considerations may be applicable to
situations where there is or is not a treaty in existence. The Westinghouse case is a par-
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(1) whether the request will relate to a criminal or civil case; 5
(2) whether the necessary information may be obtained
without the formal cooperation of the foreign authorities;
(3) whether the prospective witnesses will cooperate volun-
tarily;
(4) whether the evidence is designed for civil discovery or
grand jury purposes, or whether it is to be used at trial in this
country; 6
(5) the legal system of the foreign country from which the
evidence is being sought; and
(6) whether any particular restrictions or prohibitions are im-
posed by the foreign country with respect to the giving of
testimony or the production of documents, business records, or
other items for use in judicial proceedings in this country. 7
Any one of these considerations may be critical in determining
the success or failure of the effort to obtain evidence. In addition
to these considerations, the utilization of any of the methods
discussed below to obtain evidence may be further complicated by
the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the role of the Depart-
ment of State and United States diplomatic and consular missions
abroad.8
ticularly good example, under the Evidence Convention provisions, of several of these "con-
siderations".
" This distinction became important in the Westinghouse case once the possibility arose
that the evidence could be used in a criminal proceeding, although the initial request was
for evidence to be used in a civil case. See text at notes 248-251.
"' Use of the evidence at trial is another consideration which received extensive review
by the British courts in the Westinghouse case. The British discovery process differs
substantially from the American discovery process under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. British courts are reluctant to allow evidence to be otained which is in the nature of
a "fishing expedition" and not for use at trial. See note 130 infra. On the other hand, FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b) does not allow a witness to refuse to answer a question during the discovery
stage on the ground that the testimony will be inadmissable at trial.
"? This consideration also played an important part in the Westinghouse case. The
governments of South Africa, Canada, France and Australia had all taken action to com-
'pletely prohibit the disclosure of any information about the uranium cartel's activities in
those countries or about possible government involvement. See notes 193, 196, and 284 in-
fra. Thus, Westinghouse was foreclosed from seeking evidence about the cartel from any of
these countries. When Westinghouse sought to obtain evidence from the English subjects
involved, there was no direct government prohibition regarding disclosure. However,
ultimately the British Foreign Office and Attorney General became involved in the case.
See the text at notes 249 and 274-76.
"8 One must also add to this concern the question of the appropriate role of the Depart-
ment of Justice. The Department's request for immunity for the witnesses in the Westing-
house case, after the British subjects invoked their fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination led to an unfavorable response from the British government and, ultimately,
to an adverse decision from the House of Lords. Whether such a result was justified is
reviewed in the text beginning at note 208 infra.
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A. Obtaining Evidence Abroad without the Aid of Foreign
Authorities'9
To obtain evidence from "foreign source testimony without the
aid of foreign authorities," it is necessary that the witness be will-
ing to testify voluntarily and that no foreign laws prohibit such
testimony. 0 However, several countries "view the taking of even
voluntary testimony (by persons other than their own officials) as
an infringement of their territorial sovereignty."" If no such pro-
hibition exists and the witness is cooperative, the witness's
testimony may be obtained by stipulation, on notice,' or by com-
mission.23
" Aside from reviewing the citations to the following material, an attorney who seeks
obtain evidence abroad should supplement his knowledge of the applicable procedures
either by securing the assistance of foreign counsel or by contacting the Office of Special
Consular Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520, or the American Em-
bassy or Consulate in the country concerned. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 39 and 49,
n.23.
Id. at 34-35.
" Id. The PRACTICE MANUAL suggests two possible ways to avoid this problem: (1) ask
the witness to testify in a third country (see, e.g., The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. La.
1941); or (2) determine the possibility of having a local attorney obtain the testimony infor-
mally.
Countries which object to the taking of evidence by either the notice or commission pro-
cedure, and which tend to object when the witness volunteers testimony, are primarily civil
law countries. The objection may be more readily understood upon consideration of the dif-
ferences between the common law and civil law systems. The civil law system relies
primarily on the judge or other official for performing procedural acts. Furthermore, the
civil law system vies the trial as comprising all the elements of the litigation process. Thus,
the deposition and other pre-trial procedures are considered part of the judicial function. In
contrast, the common law system "makes the parties themselves responsible for the protec-
tion of their own interests" rather than the judge. By following rules of procedure, binding
each party to their statement of the issues, requiring each party to obtain evidence and
allowing notice to each side of the other's actions, the common law system places great em-
phasis upon the parties. This is in direct contrast to the civil law notion of having the judge
carry out the procedural steps. PRACTICE MANUAL. supra note 3, at 22-23. Note, Taking
Evidence Outside the United States, 55 B.U.L. REV. 368, 374 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Taking Evidence A broad].
2 Many of the references to particular countries which allow or prohibit various methods
of obtaining evidence abroad are dated. The citations are provided as a starting point only.
The procedures in any particular country may have changed drastically since these lists
were compiled. Therefore, they are not definitive. See note 69 infra for assistance in deter-
mining a country's current procedures. These countries may prohibit the taking of deposi-
tions by stipulation or on notice of foreign nationals within their territory: Bolivia, Bulgaria,
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Poland,
Switzerland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural
Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L. J. 515, 524 n.21 (1953).
23 Further discussion of the commission procedures begins at note 49 infra. The following
countries do not allow testimony of U.S. Nationals or their own nationals to be taken by
commission Afghanistan, Denmark,* the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Iran, Japan, Jor-
dan, Luxembourg, the People's Republic of China, Russia, Switzerland and Venezuela.
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1. Deposition by Stipulation of the Parties: Federal Rule 29
Federal Rule 29 permits the parties to provide by written
stipulation "that depositions may be taken before any person, at
any time, upon any notice, and in any manner.. ." unless the court
orders otherwise." The stipulation procedure is the "most ex-
peditious method of taking testimony abroad." 5 It does not re-
quire a foreign government's participation and the parties
themselves can be sure that they obtain testimony that will be ad-
missible in the American court." But even if there is no prohibi-
tion of the taking of testimony by the foreign government, 7 the
stipulation method is only feasible "if the parties are in agreement
and the witness is willing to testify."28 The parties have no power
to compel the testimony or even the attendance of a "recalcitrant
witness."'  A further disadvantage to this procedure is that Rule
29 does not authorize the person taking the deposition to ad-
minister oaths. 0 Therefore, under the stipulation procedure, if the
deposition is taken before a person who is not authorized by U.S.
law to administer oaths, any "perjury by the deponent may not be
punishable.""1 Thus, in effect, there is no incentive to insure the
truthfulness of the testimony.
Countries which permit the voluntary testimony of U.S. nationals to be taken by commis-
sion include: Bolivia, Bulgaria, Egypt, Finland, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Kuwait, Liberia,
Poland, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Africa and Yugoslavia. Countries which permit the
voluntary testimony of their own nationals as well as U.S. nationals to be taken by commis-
sion include: Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Ecuador, France,* Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Liechtenstein,
the Netherleands, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway,* Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the
Phillipines, Portugal,* Romania, Spain, Sweden,* Thailand, the United Kingdom* and
Uruguay. Note, Revitalization of the International Judicial Assistance Procedures of the
United States: Service of Documents and Taking of Testimony, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1375, 1388
n.56 (1964).
*These countries are now parties to the Evidence Convention and have assumed a treaty
obligation for providing evidence to one another under the terms of the Convention.
, FED. R. Civ. P. 29.
25 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 37.
2Id
' Some countries prohibit the taking of evidence by private individuals. Brazil, Bulgaria,
Taiwan, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Iceland, Indonesia, Korea, Kuwait, Morocco, Monaco, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Thailand, Tunisia and the U.S.S.R. Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21 at 375 n.43.
Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 377-38.
PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 37.
'o Cf. The commission procedure infra at not 49 which does authorize the appointed com-
missioner to administer oaths. See FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(2).
" In 1964, the applicable perjury statute was amended to make explicit the fact that per-
jury committed before any person competent to administer oaths as authorized by the U.S.
(e.g., under the commission procedure; see text at note 49 infra) would be punishable,
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2. Deposition by Notice: Federal Rule 28(b)(1)
Federal Rule 28(b)(1) authorizes the taking of depositions "on
notice before a person authorized to administer oaths32 in the
place in which the examination is held, either by the law thereof
or the law of the United States."33 The notice method does not re-
quire either United States or foreign court intervention, and of-
fers another "simple and expeditious means of obtaining foreign
source testimony for use in an American court."" It is the respon-
sibility of the moving party to "make the necessary arrangements
for the presence at the deposition of the witness,35 an appropriate
foreign official" (usually a 'notary'), a reporter, and where needed,
whether the perjury was committed within or without the U.S. 18 U.S.C.°§ 1621 (1970)
(amending Act of June 25, 1948, Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 773). There may be some question as to
the extraterritorial application of this perjury statute. See Taking Evidence Abroad, supra
note 21, at 371 n.21. In U.S. v. Pizzarusso, 338 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
936, Mrs. Pizzarusso, a Canadian citizen, made false statements under oath when applying
for a visa to enter the United States. The application for the visa was made in Montreal,
Canada. The applicant was arrested in New York after using the fraudulently obtained visa
to enter the U.S. The court held that there was no lack of jurisdiction to prevent convict-
ing the defendant of a crime. Mrs. Pizzarusso received a one year suspended sentence and
two years probation. The statute involved was 18 U.S.C. § 1546 which made it a crime to
make false statements under oath in applying for a visa. The question of extraterritorial ap-
plication concerns the principles of the protective theory vis-A-vis the territorial principle.
Asserting U.S. jurisdiction here would be based upon the protective principle. See N.
LEECH, C. OLIVER, & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 133-36 (1973). In U.S.
v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956), a perjury conviction was upheld against an
alien who perjured himself before the United States Vice Consul in Cuba. The court also ap-
plied the protective principle in U.S. v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd
sub nom, Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 366 U.S. 948
(1961).
" The note on the 1963 amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 28 states that this amended rule
(b)(1) is designed to facilitate depositions in foreign countries by enlarging the class of per-
sons before whom the depositions may be taken on notice. The class is no longer confined,
as at present, to a Secretary of Embassy or Legation, Counsul General, Consul, Vice Consul
or Consular Agent of the U.S. In a country that regards the taking of testimony by a
foreign official in aid of litigation pending in a court of another country as an infringement
upon its sovereignty, it will be expedient to take notice deposition before officers of the
country in which the examination is taken. Notes of Advisory Committee on 1963 Amend-
ment to Rules, 28 U.S.C. Appendix C. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 28, at 7784 (1970); 31
F.R.D. 640-41 (1963).
"s FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(1).
" PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 38.
' Note that some countries prohibit use of the notice method unless the deposition is to
be made by an United States national who is in the foreign country. See note 23 supra.
" Information regarding the identity and mailing addresses of foreign officials authorized
to administer oaths and to conduct such proceedings is available from several sources: cor-
respondent counsel abroad, the MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, and the Ministry of
Justice in the foreign country. Also, American consulates and embassies are authorized to
furnish lists of foreign attorneys and notaries located within their district. 22 C.F.R. 92
82(b) 1974. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 39.
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an interpreter."37 The moving party also must be certain that the
presiding foreign official is informed of "such matters as the pro-
cedure to be followed and the scope of his responsibilities.""8 In
order to avoid the added expense and difficulty involved in using
a foreign official for the notice procedure, it would be preferable
to have a United States official take the deposition. 9 Even if a
United States official is used, "the Department of State expects
that attorneys for the moving party will communicate with pro-
spective witnesses, arrange for their presence, and employ
translators and reporters."0 Finally, upon compliance with the
above-mentioned prerequisites, a deposition upon oral examina-
tion 1 or upon written questions42 can be obtained.
It should be noted that under the notice or commission pro-
cedure (described below) a party may apply for the issuance of a
subpoena under 22 U.S.C. § 1783." This procedure is expressly
" Id. at 38. It may be easier to engage foreign counsel to make the necessary ar-
rangements. A listing of local attorneys can be obtained from United States foreign service
posts. Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 370 n.12. If documents are involved,
translations may be required.
a PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 38.
, Id. at 39. See 22 U.S.C. § 1203 (1976) and 22 C.F.R. 92.4(a) which provides that:
Every secretary of embassy or legation is authorized ... within the limits of his
embassy or legation, and every consular officer of the United States is required
whenever application is made to him ... within the limits of his consulate, to ad-
minister to or take from any person any oath, affirmation, affadavit, or deposi-
tion....
See also 22 C.F.R. § 92.55(a) (1977). "Any United States consular officer may be requested to
take a deposition on notice."
40 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 40. But see 22 C.F.R. § 92.56 (1977) which states that
in lieu of special instructions the consular officer should proceed as follows in taking deposi-
tions: "(a) request the witnesses ... to appear before him ... (b) when necessary, act as in-
terpreter or translator, or see that arrangements are made for some qualified person to act
in this capacity; (c) ... administer oaths ... ; (d) have the witness examined in accordance
with the procedure described in §§ 92.57 to 92.60; (e) either record, or have recorded in his
presence and under his direction, the testimony of the witnesses; (f) take the testimony, or
have it taken, stenographically ... ; (g) be actually present throughout the examination of
witnesses ... ; (h) mark ... all documents identified by a witness or counsel and submitted
for the record."
,' FED. R. Civ. P. 30.
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 31.
48 As to official fees, see C.F.R. §§ 22.1, 92.68 and 92.70.
The subpoena will be issued by the court provided that it finds that the particular
testimony or the production of the document ... is necessary in the interest of justice ...
and ... that it is not possible to obtain his testimony in admissable form without his per-
sonal appearance .... 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976). See Smit, International Litigation under the
United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1035-39 (1965) for details of amended § 1783, and
[1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3782. See generally International Litigation, note 98
infra, at 240-42.
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authorized by Rule 45(e)(2).45 The subpoena can be served only on a
national or resident of the United States who is located in a
foreign country." Failure to comply with the subpoena may result
in a finding of contempt under 28 U.S.C. § 1784."' Thus, utilization
of § 1783, coupled with the contempt provisions of § 1784, "provides
virtually the same scope of discovery as would be available from
similar witnesses present in the United States."48
3. Deposition by Commission: Federal Rule 28(b)(2)
Rule 28(b)(2) provides that depositions may be taken in a foreign
country "before a person commissioned by the court, and a person
so commissioned shall have the power, by virtue of his commis-
sion, to administer any necessary oath and take testimony.'' 4
When a party requests that the court appoint a person as commis-
sioner, the district court will appoint such an individual to take the
evidence. This appointment is the court's written order giving the
commissioner the "power to take the testimony of a witness who
cannot appear personally to be examined in court .... ,,1o The pro-
cedure is quite similar to the notice procedure" except that "it re-
quires the court to appoint the person before whom the testimony
is to be taken. '5 2 The court. may, for example, appoint a foreign of-
ficial or a private person in a foreign country to take testimony
FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2).
" The power of Congress to provide legislation for service of subpoenas on U.S. citizens
outside the U.S. derives from the fact that the U.S. possesses power inherent in its
sovereignty to require the return to this country of a citizen, who is resident elsewhere,
whenever the public interest requires it, and to penalize him in case of refusal. U.S. v. Lan-
sky, 496 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 502 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1974). The basis
for American jurisdiction is the residency or nationality of the witness and not his
presence. Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 375 n. 47. This power has been upheld
in several cases. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1942). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 10(b) (1965). "No case has been reported in-
volving a subpoena directed to an alien resident." Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21,
at 375. But cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976), rehearing denied
535 F.2d 660,/ert. denied, 429 U.S. 940, where the court held it had power to subpoena a
non-resident alien present in the United States.
" 23 U.S.C. § 1784 permits the court to levy upon or seize an individual's property within
the U.S. and to impose a fine of up to $100,000. Sale of the property may be ordered to
satisfy such a fine. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
" Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 377. Note that the § 1784 sanctions also ap-
ply to the use of the commission procedure discussed in the next section of the text. When
evidence is sought from a foreign national, a situation which falls outside the scope of §
1783, the use of a letter rogatory (letter of request) is required to compel testimony.
" FED. R. CIv. P. 28(b)(2).
22 C.F.R. § 92.53 (1977).
" See the text at notes 32-48 supra.
, PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 41.
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under this procedure." Nevertheless, "this method is rarely used;
commissions are generally issued to United States consular of-
ficers."'" As with the notice procedure, evidence obtained under
the commission procedure must conform to the procedural re-
quirements of the district court because the process is carried out
under the federal rules. 5
Generally, the notice or commission procedures are the prefer-
red methods for obtaining evidence abroad. They require little
judicial action and the evidence obtained will conform with the
procedural requirements of the district court." There also may be
a further advantage to the commission procedure in some coun-
tries. If the country provides for compulsory process when the
commissioner petitions the foreign tribunal for assistance, a
witness could be compelled to testify even though the witness
may be a foreign national.5 1 However, the same considerations
which apply to the compulsion that foreign courts will apply under
the letters rogatory process would seem to be applicable for the
commission procedure as well.'
B. Obtaining Evidence Abroad with the Aid of Foreign
Authorities
In a situation where the witness does not voluntarily agree to
testify, where foreign law prohibits the use of the notice or com-
mission procedures, or, for some other reason, the above described
5' One advantage of such an appointment would be that evidence could be obtained even
in those countries which would not permit a U.S. consular official to take evidence under
the notice procedure. See notes 22, 23, and 28 supra. If, however, the country considers the
taking of testimony as a sovereign function, the commission procedure will not be available.
22 C.F.R. § 92.66 (1977). The reason for this is that use of a consular officer is easier
and less expensive than going through a foreign official. If the U.S. consular officer is used,
it is more convenient to follow the notice procedure. Therefore, the notice procedure would
be used more often and nearly always when a U.S. consular official is involved. See Taking
Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 371-72.
M PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3. at 41.
0 Cf. the letters rogatory procedure discussed below. Under this procedure the evidence
is obtained through the assistance of the foreign court. And such evidence may not be in
conformance with the district court's requirements for admissability. See note 21 supra.
For additional information about the commission procedure, see 22 C.F.R. §§ 92.51 et seq.
"7 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 41. As an example of an act providing for compul-
sion of such a witness, see The Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975,
note 219 infra.
" See the discussion of foreign courts compelling their own nationals to testify under the
letters rogatory procedure in STEINER & VAGHTS, supra note 3, at 838. A foreign court,
under a letter of request, may compel testimony of its own national who is a non-party
witness. See text at notes 64, 148 and 163 infra.
" See note 21 supra. Some countries prohibit the use of the notice or commission pro-
cedure except when taking evidence from an American national. Other countries will pro-
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procedures are not available to take evidence abroad without the
aid of foreign authorities, 0 it would be necessary to seek the
assistance of the appropriate foreign authorities in order to obtain
evidence. "The customary method of obtaining the assistance of
foreign authorities is by means of a letter of request or letter
rogatory. ' The letter of request "denotes a formal request from
a court, in which an action is pending, to a foreign court to per-
form some judicial act."6 It is also true that, in the absence of a
treaty obligation or an international agreement," a foreign court
may refuse to honor the request, based upon its view of comity
between the countries." If, however, the foreign court does
hibit any private individuals from taking evidence, because such act is considered an in-
fringement upon their sovereignty. See note 28 supra; Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note
21, at 374-75. For information about the appropriate procedure in a country see note 72 in-
fra. See also 22 C.F.R. § 92.66 (1977).
"O In some foreign countries, American consular officers are not allowed to take
testimony. 22 C.F.R. § 92.55(c) (1977) states that the right to take depositions only exists if
the laws or authorities of the national government will permit a deposition to be taken;
unless there is a treaty which establishes such a right. If a consular officer receives a notice
or commission to take testimony in such a country, he should return it and indicate what
other methods may be available, for example letters of request, to obtain the testimony.
Section 92.66 states that "where depositions must be taken before a foreign authority, let-
ters rogatory are usually issued to a foreign court." 22 C.F.R. § 92.66 (1977).
"1 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 42. Examples are requests for the taking of
evidence, the issuing of a summons, subpoena, or other legal notice or the execution of a
civil judgment. In United States usage, letters rogatory have been utilized only for the pur-
pose of obtaining evidence. Requests rest upon the comity of courts toward each other and
embody a promise of reciprocity. 22 C.F.R. § 92.54 (1977). See 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1976) and
the Evidence Convention which utilizes the letter of request as the primary means to ob-
tain judicial assistance; see notes 121 and 136 infra. "The usual form of requesting judicial aid
between states is the venerable commission-rogatoire, or what we call in English the letter
rogatory." 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 12 at 204 (1968).
A "letter rogatory" is under the control of the foreign court for compliance, while the
notice or commission procedure would be controlled by the issuing court. Volkswagenwerk
Aktien Geselleschaft v. Superior Court In and For Sacramento County, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219,
33 Cal.App.3d 503 (1973). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1050 (4th ed. 1968).
8 22 C.F.R. § 92.54 (1977).
" E.g., the Evidence Convention discussed infra at note 165 et seq. Article 12 of the Con-
vention "permits refusal to execute a letter only to the extent that (a) the execution is not
within the function of the judiciary or (b) the state of execution considers that its sovereignty
or security would be prejudiced thereby." President's Message to Congress Transmitting
the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, SEN. EXEC. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Message of the President]. Thus, it appears that unless the request for
evidence will prejudice the sovereignty of a signatory, the request must be complied with
under the Evidence Convention. See note 157 infra.
", See note 5 supra. The Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands will not com-
pel a witness' testimony on the basis of a letter rogatory if there is no treaty agreement in
effect. Therefore, if the witness is a national of these countries, his testimony cannot be ob-
tained. Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 373 n. 35. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many became a signatory of the Evidence Convention on October 21, 1971. As of 1977,
however, the country had not ratified the convention.
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recognize the validity of the request, it will have the witnesses ap-
pear for examination, 5 provided that the other aspects of the pro-
cedure have been complied with.
Federal Rule 28(b)(3) prescribes the basic procedure to be
followed. Upon application by a party
a letter rogatory shall be issued ... on terms that are just and
appropriate. It is not requisite to the issuance of .. .a letter
rogatory that the taking of the deposition in any other manner
is impracticable or inconvenient .... A letter rogatory may be
addressed 'to the appropriate authority in [here name the coun-
try].'6 6
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1781(a)(2), "the Department of State has power
. ..to receive a letter rogatory issued ...by a tribunal in the
United States, to transmit it to the foreign or international
tribunal .... and to receive and return it after execution."" In ad-
dition, under 28 U.S.C. § 1781(b)(2), a letter rogatory may be trans-
mitted directly from a United States court 8 to the foreign or in-
ternational tribunal. 9
" In civil law countries the court itself will examine the witness. However, in a common
law country a special examiner is appointed "before whom the evidence will be taken by the
attorneys in the usual manner." Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 373 n. 34.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(3).
'7 The term "tribunal" indicates that letters of request may be issued not only between
courts, but also other semijudicial agencies; for example, a public prosecutor. See note 4
supra. Note that most courts will not honor requests from a purely administrative tribunal
or from executive departments or agencies because the letter of request has not been
issued by a judicial authority. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 43-44. It is also true that
most countries will not honor requests issued in connection with a court martial. However,
"foreign courts frequently honor requests from Federal courts in connection with grand
jury investigations." United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1971). PRACTICE
MANUAL, supra note 3, at 44. Cf. the result of the Westinghouse case and the House of Lord's
objection that evidence could not be obtained under the Evidence Convention for a criminal
investigation, note 268 infra.
" Federal courts have held that the issuing of letters of request is among their inherent
powers. De Villeneuve v. Morning Journal Ass'n., 206 F. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Gross v.
Palmer, 105 F. 833 (N.D. Ill. 1900). Such requests will be issued in civil cases, Zassenhaus v.
Evening Star Newspaper Co., 404 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and in criminal cases, Reagan
v. United States, 433 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1971), where it is impossible to secure evidence from
abroad through some other procedure. Cf. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 43. See also
Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 372 n. 26. Recall that Federal Rule 28 states
that it is not required for issuance of a letter of request that the evidence is not obtainable
in some other manner, or even that such other manner is inconvenient.
69 See 22 C.F.R. §92.66 (1977) regarding the direct transmittal of letters rogatory from
court to court. Some foreign governments require that the request be made through diplo-
matic channels. Inquiries concerning customary procedural requirements in given countries
may be addressed to the American embassy or legation in foreign capitals, or to the Depart-
ment of State, Washington D.C. 20520. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 44. See note 89
infra.
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Although the requirements mentioned in § 1781 are rather suc-
cinct, there are additional requirements which should be followed
in the preparation of the letter of request. It should indicate the
caption of the case along with the phrase "Request for Interna-
tional Judicial Assistance."7 The letter should be addressed to the
foreign court which will execute the request7' and should describe
the parties and the nature of the suit. 2 The letter of request
should be written in clear language, avoiding the use of complex
sentences and "cumbersome grammar," since "American
legalisms are unintelligible to foreign courts."'73 The letter should
specifically state the needs of the requesting party. An ap-
propriate request would state: "it is requested that you cause Mr.
X to appear before you and to answer, under oath, the written
questions and cross questions which are attached."7' If oral
testimony is sought, it is best to specify the procedure to be
followed. "Foreign courts apply their own procedures if a specific
method is not designated. 7 5 If it is desired that the foreign court
propound certain questions to the witness, the request should in-
clude the specific questions to be asked. The letter of request
70 Id
" Id. If the foreign court is unknown, the letter should be addressed to "The Appropriate
Judicial Authority in (here name the country)." See FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(3).
7 Usually, statements that "the evidence is being sought for use in a judicial proceeding
which is presently pending before this court," and that "the evidence is necessary to insure
that justice is done," or that "the evidence is required in the interest of justice" will be in-
cluded. Id. at 45. Cf. note 129 infra.
" I& An example of language used can be found in the appendix to the FED. R. Civ. P. 28.
Conformance to this rule will facilitate the procurement of an accurate and concise transla-
tion, particularly in situations in which the translator has no legal training.
74 Id.
" Note, though, that it may be within the discretion of the foreign court whether to
follow the requested procedure.
7 Because of the differences between civil and common law procedures, the letter of re-
quest must be very specific in this regard. Civil law countries concentrate on letters of re-
quest, while common law countries usually take testimony on notice, by stipulation or
through commissions to consuls. The civil law technique results in a resume of the evidence
which is prepared by the executing judge and signed by the witness. The common law pro-
cedure, in contrast, results in a verbatim transcript of the witness' testimony certified by
the reporter. Message of the President, supra note 63, at VI. In addition, civil law countries
are not accustomed to taking testimony under oath without a specific request to do so. "One
may always request the foreign court to provide a verbatim transcript ... to [give] advance
notice of the proceedings ... so that a representative of the requesting authority may at-
tend the hearing . . . [and to] permit a designated representative of the requesting court
either to conduct the examination himself or to participate by way of asking supplementary
questions after the judge has conducted the examinations in chief." PRACTICE MANUAL.
supra note 3, at 46-47. See generally 22 C.F.R. §92.57 (1977). Some foreign courts will not
permit private individuals to conduct an examination. See note 27 supra. Concerning the ad-
missability of evidence, see note 89 infra and accompanying text.
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and its accompanying documents should be translated into the
language of the state where the letters are to be executed (state
of execution)" and submitted in duplicate." The letter should also
contain a provision "to reimburse the foreign court for all costs
which it may incur in executing the request."79 Finally, a letter of
request generally includes an offer to provide reciprocal
assistance in a similar case.80 The letter of request in United
States v. Reagan"1 is a modern illustration of one used successfully
in a criminal case. 2
After the letter of request is drafted and signed by the judge, it
is ready for transmittal." Transmittal can be accomplished either
through the State Department" or by the court directly to the ex-
ecuting authority abroad. Provided the foreign government does
not object, direct transmittal is usually the faster of the two
methods. 5 It also may be advisable to retain local counsel to pre-
sent the letter of request to the executing court. 6 Regardless of
the method used, however, it is impossible to predict accurately
" PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 47.
I /d.
"g Id. at 48. Charges for letters of request submitted through American officials are
prescribed by the Tariff or Fees Schedule, Foreign Service of the United States. 22 C.F.R.
§22.1 (1977).
so PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 48.
' 453 F.2d 165, 168 (6th Cir. 1971).
' PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 48. See also excerpts from the Westinghouse letter
of request at notes 202 and 203 infra. The PRACTICE MANUAL cautions against the use of
published samples of letters of request because "they often employ archaic or unduly
technical language which may well be unintelligible to a civil law court." Examples of these
forms (together with supporting motions and explanatory notes) can be found at: 2A
BENDER, FEDERAL PRACTICE FORMS 148-61; 8 AM. JUR., PLEADING AND PRACTICE FORMS
(Rev.), Depositions and Discovery, Forms 171 et seq.; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, Form
Nos. 15:21, 15:22; 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1921-66 (paras. 28.03-28.09(3), Deposition
Abroad). See also 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE FORMS, Form Nos. 15:24.1 and 15:25.
'a PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 48.
" See note 69 supra. See 22 C.F.R. §92.66 (1977) for a description of the role of the State
Department in transmitting requests abroad. Note, too, that "the diplomatic channel is
cumbersome in operation" and may take more time than the parties desire. "However, in a
case of particular urgency or importance (the Justice Dep't.) is prepared to urge the Depart-
ment of State to expedite the diplomatic transmission process to the extent possible in
countries whose courts insist on the use of diplomatic channels." PRACTICE MANUAL, supra
note 3, at 14, 49.
28 U.S.C. §1781(b)(2) permits direct transmittal. See notes 68 and 69 supra.
" This may be especially appropriate in certain common law jurisdictions. For civil law
practice see INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN LITIGATION: EUROPE (Smit ed. 1965). Current in-
formation as to the required procedures can be obtained from the Office of Special Consular
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at
49.
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the length of time required for a letter of request to be executed.87
Usually letters of request "travel slowly" and a "prompt response
is the exception rather than the rule."88 Thus, it is best to seek
foreign source evidence at the earliest opportunity.
After the letter of request has been executed, one is left with
the difficult task of determining the legal sufficiency of the
testimony and documents obtained. Such a determination is made
by the American court in which the proceedings are being held.89
Furthermore, under Rule 28(b), evidence obtained in response to a
letter rogatory need not be excluded merely because it is not a
verbatim transcript," because the testimony was not taken under
oath, or for any similar departures from the United States rules
for depositions."
In summary, the letters rogatory process may be utilized to ob-
tain evidence in a foreign country, but it is a complicated ' and
time consuming" process. Even if all of the procedural re-
quirements are met, the evidence obtained may not be useful at
trial in the United States." And, while the American procedures
", PRACTICE MANUAL. supra note 3, at 50. The time involved depends on such factors as
the legal system in the state of execution, the nature and complexity of the request and the
attitude of officials in the state of execution.
" Id. Authorities have noted that letters of request normally require at least three
months for execution. Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 374 n. 38. In one instance
it took in excess of a year for the requests to be executed. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3,
at 50. In the Westinghouse case, for example, the letter of request never was executed. The
lower court proceedings and the final decision in the case took more than 14 months from
the time the letter of request was received in England.
" See 22 C.F.R. §92.54 (1977).
"V For the usual practice in civil law countries not resulting in a verbatim transcript see
note 76 supra.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b). It may be advisable to make particular requests in the letter
rogatory in order to obtain evidence which may be used at trial in the U.S. See note 76
supra. Note, too, the converse problem: the discovery limits under the Federal Rules are
very broad, while in many foreign countries the discovery of evidence which may lead to
evidence admissible at trial is not allowed. "Many countries, including common law coun-
tries, will not honor requests which have been issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial
discovery." PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 43. See, e.g., Re Radio Corp. of America v.
Rauland Corp., [19561 5 D.L.R.2d 424; Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., 2 W,L.R.
281, aff'd 1 Q.B. 618 (1956); Penn-Texas Corp. v. Anstalt, [1963] 1 All E.R. 258 (C.A.). See
note 16 supra in which it is indicated that letters of request are not to be used for "fishing
expeditions."
" "International litigation is beset with difficulties not encountered in even the most
complex domestic litigation, difficulties arising by reason of different legal systems and
jurisprudential concepts." Sklaver, Obtaining Evidence in International Litigation, 7
CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 233 (1976) [hereinafter cited as International Litigation].
"3 See note 87 supra and accompanying text. "Currently counsel who need to take
evidence abroad may be required to expend a disproportionate amount of time, effort, and
money .. " Taking Evidence Abroad, supra, note 21, at 379.
" See note 89 and accompanying text.
120 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. [Vol. 10:1
for permitting foreign countries to take evidence in the United
States are very liberal,95 the reverse is not often true. 6 Moreover,
any of the several procedures followed by American counsel
under the Federal Rules is fraught with complex procedural in-
tricacies in addition to the inherent difficulties involved in inter-
national communication. Given the diverse internal practices of
each foreign country and the tremendous uncertainty over the ap-
propriate current practice in a particular country," it is not sur-
prising that several countries, including the United States, have
sought to remedy these problems. The existence of such
disparities could have an adverse impact on the growth of interna-
tional trade, since businessmen may be unwilling to enter con-
tracts or to rely on foreign commitments if there is no recourse to
a satisfactory judicial resolution of any problems which might
arise," In order to simplify the process of international judicial
assistance, the Hague Conference on Private International Law99
was encouraged to draft a convention on the taking of evidence
abroad.
III. OBTAINING EVIDENCE ABROAD UNDER THE HAGUE
EVIDENCE CONVENTION ON CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS'00
A. History and Purpose
Following the success in drafting and ratifying the Convention
on the Service Abroad of Judicial Documents,' the Department
" For a brief overview of the liberal American procedure see note 4 supra. See also In-
ternational Litigation, supra note 92, at 235-42.
" See notes 22 and 27 supra.
7 ,". .. [Ilt is often difficult to determine the practice prevalent in a country without ex-
tensive inquiries. In some jurisdictions, practices have not been reduced to written form.
Moreover, even when a written statement of a particular country's policy is available, there
may be a disparity between the actual practice and the written statement." Taking
Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 374 n. 41.
" See International Litigation, supra note 92, at 233.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law was established upon the in-
itiative of the government of the Netherlands and has been active in the field of the unifica-
tion of private international law since 1893. The U.S. participated as an observer at the
1956 and 1960 sessions of the Conference. In 1964, the U.S. became a member of the Con-
ference pursuant to Public Law 88-244, 77 Stat. 775 (1963). See Message of the President,
supra note 63, at V.
100 The Evidence Convention will be discussed in general, with a special emphasis upon
the letters of request procedure. The author's purpose is to provide an adequate framework
for utilizing the Convention in obtaining evidence abroad as well as to provide a more
thorough understanding of the Westinghouse case.
,01 The Service Convention was ratified by the U.S. in April, 1967. See note 3 supra for a
brief discussion of this Convention.
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of State recommended that a revision be made in the 1954 Hague
Convention dealing with letters rogatory and the taking of
evidence in foreign countries. At the Hague, a special commission
prepared a proposed draft treaty, and the Conference on Private
International Law unanimously adopted a final text in 1968.02 On
June 1, 1970, the Evidence Convention was opened for signature
at the Hague. It was signed by the United States on July 27, 1970,
and two years later advice and consent of the Senate was given,
without dissent.' At the present time seven countries have
ratified the Convention.0 4
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations suggested, in its
report on the Evidence Convention, that the willingness of the
Hague Conference to proceed promptly with its work on the Con-
vention was perhaps attributable "to the difficulties encountered
by courts and lawyers in obtaining evidence abroad from coun-
tries with markedly different legal systems.""1 5 One of the primary
purposes of the Evidence Convention drafters was to "bridge the
gap between common law practice ... (in which parties have the
duty of securing evidence and presenting it at trial) and the civil
law concept of judicial sovereignty . . . (in which evidence is ob-
tained primarily by the courts with the parties serving only to
assist the judicial authorities)."" 8 The Convention endeavored to
provide a standardized framework in which evidence for use in a
requesting country may be obtained from another country
without concern for all of the procedural particularities existing in
102 Amram, United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J. OF INT'L. L. 104 (1973) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Ratification].
See note 1 supra.
103 Id. at 104.
04 Currently the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Portugal, Norway,
France, and Denmark have ratified the Evidence Convention. See note 1 supra.
"'o S. REP. N9. 92-95, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972).
'0' Internati/nal Litigation, supra note 92, at 242. See note 76 supra. "The act of taking
evidence in a common law country from a willing witness, without compulsion and without
a breach of the peace, in aid of a foreign proceeding, is a purely private matter, in which the
host country has no interest and in which its judicial authorities have normally no wish to
participate. To the contrary, the same act in a civil law country may be a public matter, and
may constitute the performance of a judicial act by an unauthorized person. It may violate
the judicial sovereignty of the host country, unless its authorities participate or give their
consent." U.S. Report on the Hague Convention, supra note 2, at 806-7. The perspective of
the civil law country involved has a direct bearing upon the choice of a method for obtain-
ing evidence: letter of request, taking evidence by a consular officer or the use of a commis-
sioner. The latter two methods raise serious questions of intrusion upon the sovereignty of
the country where the evidence is to be taken. However, with the letter of request there is
no such risk because the courts of one state request the courts of another state to obtain
the evidence. Id.
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the state of execution. To attain this simplification, the Convention
sought to have the ratifying countries agree "to follow as closely
as possible the practice and procedure of the requesting state, in
order that the evidence might be taken in a manner which most
closely approached the technique of the forum where the action
was pending (ie., the requesting state)."1 " The value of such an
agreement would be the elimination of unnecessary expenditures
of time, effort or money in the procurement of evidence and
greater likelihood of its admissiblity at trial in the requesting
state.1" Additionally, the problem of deciphering the procedural
practices in the executing state would be avoided. Finally, and
perhaps more importantly, an international treaty would provide
a firm legal basis for securing evidence in a foreign country
without concern for ultimate legal justification and dependence on
"the vague and uncertain duties imposed by international
comity."1 Evidence could be obtained pursuant to treaty terms,
thus eliminating the problem of another country's refusal to honor
a letter of request.
In short, the Evidence Convention provided a standardized pro-
cedure for obtaining evidence in a foreign country; it eliminated
problems which occur because of the jurisprudential differences of
common law and civil law countries; and it established a founda-
tion of international treaty law, rather than comity, for supporting
requests to obtain evidence in another country.110 Finally, the
Evidence Convention, once ratified by a country, replaced all
previous methods for obtaining evidence between the ratifying
Id. at 806.
Id. Perhaps the most succinct expression of the Convention's underlying philosophy
was that "any system of obtaining evidence or securing the performance of other judicial
acts internationally must be tolerable in the state of execution and must also be utilizable in
the forum of the state of origin where the action is pending." Amram, Explanatory Report
on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
reprinted in Message of the President, supra note 63 at 11-42.
'" Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 379-80. See note 5 supra regarding comity.
"Countries ratifying the Convention assume a treaty obligation to honor foreign evidence
requests in instances covered by the Convention, and they may not decline to honor
evidence requests from other ratifying countries except under the limited conditions
specified in Article 12 of the Convention." PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 25-26. Article
12 permits refusal to honor a letter of request if execution does not fall within the judicial
function or if the executing country's sovereignty would be prejudiced.
110 For additional details of the purpose and history of the Evidence Convention see U.S.
Report on the Hague Conference, supra note 3, at 804-808; Amram, The Proposed Conven-
tion on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A.J. 651 (1969). The Message of the Presi-
dent, supra note 63, contains the submission of the Secretary of State, the text of the Con-
vention and the official explanatory report of the rapporteur of Commission III which
prepared the Convention.
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countries."' As a result, the convention eliminated any need to
proceed through time consuming diplomatic channels in order to
obtain evidence.1
B. General Outline of the Convention Provisions
In order to serve the purposes discussed in the section above,
the Evidence Convention: (1) makes letters of request the prin-
cipal means of obtaining evidence abroad;"' (2) attempts to im-
prove methods for obtaining evidence by increasing the power of
consuls and by introducing in civil law countries the use of com-
missioners to take evidence;'. (3) provides the appropriate pro-
cedure to obtain evidence in the form needed by the requesting
court;"' and (4) preserves any more liberal practices currently ac-
cepted by signatories."" The forty-two articles of the Convention
are divided into three chapters: Chapter I, Letters of Request, (ar-
ticles 1-14); Chapter II, Taking Evidence by Diplomatic Officers,
Consular Agents and Commissioners, (articles 15-22); and Chapter
III, General Clauses, (articles 23-42).
Letters of request are the principle vehicles for obtaining
"' Ratification of the Convention in the U.S. presented few problems because of the
already liberal procedures of 28 U.S.C. §1781 et seq. for allowing foreign countries to obtain
evidence in this country. See note 4 supra. Ratification required little change in the present
U.S. procedure. Message of the President, supra note 63, at XI. Note that the Convention
expressly preserves "for each signatory party all provisions of its internal law [which] are
more favorable to, and grant more generous assistance to foreign courts and litigants than
the methods prescribed in the Convention." U.S. Ratification, supra note 102, at 107. Thus,
the more liberal U.S. Code procedures are in effect for foreign litigants who desire to ob-
tain evidence in this country.
11 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 25.
,, Use of the letters of request procedure becomes even more important because all of
the foreign countries which have ratified the Convention "have interposed major reserva-
tions [as permitted by Article 331 with respect to the operation of Chapter II, Taking
Evidence by Diplomatic Officers, Consular Agents and Commissioners." PRACTICE MANUAL,
supra note 3, at 30. Article 33 states in pertinent part: "A state may at the time of
signature, ratification, or accession exclude, in whole or in part, the application of the provi-
sions of... Chapter II. No other reservation shall be permitted." States which have made
such reservations are Denmark and Norway. See 28 U.S.C.A. §1781 for a listing of declara-
tions and reservations. For subsequent declarations and reservations of countries which
ratify the Convention, consult with the Department of Justice (Civil Division, Foreign
Litigation Unit) or the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 30.
... See the reservations with respect to Chapter II which have been made by civil law
countries. See note 113 supra.
15 See note 106 supra.
... See note 111 supra. S. Rep. No. 92-95, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972). The Convention at
least establishes a set of minimum standards with which contracting states agree to comp-
ly. Message of the President, supra note 63, at VI.
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
evidence under the Convention. "7 Letters of request are covered
exclusively in articles 1-14 and are also governed by some of the
general clauses, such as articles 23-28, 33, 35 and 36.118 The
Chapter I articles regulate the form of the letter, its scope and
content, methods of transmission, language to be used, methods
and technique of execution, compulsion which may be exercised
against a witness, permissable grounds for refusal to execute the
letter, privileges and immunities of witnesses and questions of
costs and expenses. "9 The Convention also increases the power of
consuls, by permitting them to take evidence informally without
the use of judicial authorities and provides for the commission
procedure to take evidence."'
Chapter II regulates the situations in which a consul or Com-
missioner may act (such as the use of compulsion against a
witness), provides for the regulation of their activity by the state of
execution, defines the limits of a commissioner's power, and identi-
fies other channels for obtaining evidence should the commission
method fail. Chapter II also sets out the extent to which the execut-
ing state's approval and consent may be required.'21 For example,
Chapter II provides that a consular officer may, without compul-
sion, take evidence from his own nationals for use in his own coun-
try's courts. But the consul may take evidence from non-nationals
only with the consent of the state where the evidence is to be
taken."2
Finally, Chapter III, which contains the general clauses, covers
such matters as the relationship between the present Convention
and the 1905 and 1954 conventions, the reservation power of
signatories, the states which may be signatories or which may ac-
cede to the Convention, the use of diplomatic channels to resolve
disputes and the time limits for when the Convention will enter into
and remain in effect.2 3 Chapter III also provides limitations on the
scope of letters of request, indicates details respecting the opera-
tion of the Central Authority and contains provisions by which
states may derogate from the Convention or make certain reser-
vations upon ratification. This Chapter also includes the "all-
important provisions that if any state, by internal law or practice,
"7 U.S. Ratification, supra note 102, at 105.
U.S. Report on the Hague Conference, supra note 3, at 808.
'' S. REP. No. 92-95, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
12 U.S. Ratification, supra note 102, at 105.
1' S. REP. No. 92-95, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972).
" Id. at 4.
121 Id. at 2.
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permits any act on a more liberal.., basis ... such internal law or
practice ... will continue to govern (despite the provisions of the
Convention)."1 24
C. Procedural Requirements for Utilizing the Hague Evidence
Convention1 25
1. Chapter One of the Convention
American attorneys who desire to utilize the Evidence Conven-
tion should be aware of the following provisions which apply to
the letters of request procedure. Article One states that in civil or
commercial matters 12  a judicial authority 12 1 of a contracting state
may, in accordance with the laws of that state, request the compe-
tent authority of another contracting state, by means of a letter of
request, to obtain evidence or to perform some other judicial
act.'28 This article also indicates that letters of request "shall not
" Id. at 2. See also Message of the President, supra note 63, at 12-13. The concept of the
Central Authority was devised for use originally in the Service Convention, supra note 3.
The central authority is designated by each state. Letters of request will be transmitted
through this central authority (See Article 2 of the Evidence Convention at note 133),
which receives letters of request from another country and transmits them to the compe-
tent authority in its own country, which then executes the letters. The central authority
designated by the U.S. is the Department of Justice. But 28 U.S.C. §1781(a) still authorizes
the State Department to receive letters. If it does, they are sent on to the Department of
Justice. Exec. Order No. 11,698, reprinted in [1973] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3477.
See International Litigation, supra note 92, at 247, and Taking Evidence Abroad, supra
note 21, at 381.
12 Two previous articles present a general discussion of the Evidence Convention: Tak-
ing Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 379-386 and International Litigation, supra note 92,
at 242-254. In addition, both the Message of the President, supra note 63, containing the of-
ficial explanatory report of the Hague rapporteur at 11-42, and the U.S. Report on the
Hague Conference, supra note 3, at 808-820, provide additional material which would be
quite helpful in analyzing specific provisions of the Convention. The emphasis of this paper
will be procedural, particularly with regard Chapter I of the Convention. However, rele-
vant background information will be indicated in the footnotes.
12 The Evidence Convention is limited to taking evidence in "civil or commercial" mat-
ters. However, this term is not defined in the Convention. Other treaties of the Hague Civil
Procedure Conference use the term, and it also appears in bilateral agreements between
the United Kingdom and Continental countries. For more than "sixty years .. .there has
never been a recorded disagreement between any two members of the Hague Conference
...over the meaning of this term or over its applicability to a particular request for
assistance in securing evidence. The delegates at the conference agreed unanimously that
no definition was needed." U.S. Report on the Hague Conference, supra note 3, at 808. Cf.
the problems concerning such definitional matters in the Westinghouse case, infra.
2' This term is not defined. The US. Report on the Hague Conference, supra note 3, at
808, indicates that this was deliberate in order to provide flexibility. See Taking Evidence
Abroad, supra note 21, at 382. There are many judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in common
and civil law countries. Thus, a precise definition would be problematic.
28 The term "other judicial act" does not include the service of documents (see the Ser-
vice Convention supra note 3), enforcement of judgments, or provisional or protective
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
be used to obtain evidence which is not intended for use in judicial
proceedings, commenced or contemplated."'" This is interpreted
to preclude the use of letters of request to seek evidence such as
pre-trial discovery, or evidence which is not itself to be used at
trial, but which will be used to discover other possibly admissable
evidence.3 ° Thus, attorneys should draft requests which are "as
specific as possible" and which state that the evidence being
sought will be "for use in a judicial proceeding." Counsel should
assiduously avoid reference to the term "pre-trial discovery."'
Once a letter of request is prepared,"2 it is transmitted directly
from the court in the requesting country to the designated central
authority"' in the state of execution, in accordance with Article
Two of the Convention. The benefit of this requirement is that it
dispenses with the need for intermediaries, thus saving a signifi-
cant amount of time.'
Article Three prescribes the necessary contents of a letter of
request:
(1) the name and address of the authority requesting its execu-
tion and of the authority requested to execute it;
(2) the names and addresses of the parties to the proceedings
and their reprsentatives, if any;
(3) the nature of the proceedings for which the evidence is re-
quired, and pertinent information with respect to the particulars
thereof;
(4) the specific evidence to be obtained, or the other judicial act
to be performed;
measures such as injunctions, restraining orders, forced sales, receiverships or mandamus.
The act requested must be recognized as a judicial act under the domestic law and practice
of the state of execution. Message of the President, supra note 63, at VII.
" However, letters of request may be used to perpetuate testimony of an aged, dying or
departing witness. Id. at VII and 13. See also Taking Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at
383. Cf. note 72 supra.
'" See Article 23 of the Convention which provides that a state may declare that it will
not honor letters of request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of
documents as known in common law countries. This provision was adopted pursuant to a re-
quest of the United Kingdom delegation, and refers to the procedure wherein a party may
obtain access, before trial, to documents in the possession of his adversary. The purpose, of
course, would be to aid the party in preparation of the pleadings. Note that the procedure
varies among countries and some may be willing to allow letters of request for this purpose,
while other will not. Message of the President, supra note 63, at 15. See also Taking
Evidence Abroad, supra note 21, at 383, especially note 91. See notes 208, 219, and 221 infra
which indicate this problem in the Westinghouse case.
.. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 26-27.
' Cf the letters rogatory procedure, note 69 supra.
li See note 124 supra regarding the central authority concept.
See Message of the President, supra note 63, at 15 for additional considerations of this
article.
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(5) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined;
(6) the questions to be put to the persons to be examined, or
alternatively, a statement of the underlying facts in sufficient
detail to enable the foreign authority to formulate its own ques-
tions;
(7) a complete description of the documents or other property,
real or personal, to be inspected, if applicable;
(8) any requirement that the testimony be given on oath or affir-
mation, and if so, any special form to be used; and
(9) any special method or procedure to be used under Article 9.
Mention may also be made of privileges to refuse to give infor-
mation (Article 11).'15
No formal authentication of the letter of request is required.'"
Article Four provides rules on the correct language to be used
in drafting the letter. It employs the conventional rule that every
letter of request must be written in the language of the state of
execution or accompanied by a translation into that language.' 7
Any such translation must be certified as correct by either a
diplomatic officer, consular officer or agent; or by a sworn trans-
lator or by an authorized person.' 8
Article Five permits the executing state to refuse to execute
the letter if it does not comply with the formal requirements of
the Convention. The central authority is to advise promptly the
requesting state of any defect. Such notice should help insure
prompt correction of any technical or formal errors in the letter.
Another very practical provision is Article Six, which allows
misdirected letters of request to be forwarded to the appropriate
authority in the state of execution.' 9
Articles Seven and Eight regulate the notice to be given of the
actual execution of the letter and the persons who may be pre-
sent. Under Article Seven, the requesting authority has the right
"s' This article is modelled on the United Kingdom bilateral conventions. If the authority
to whom the letter should be directed is unknown, it is sufficient to direct the letter to the
"appropriate authority of the State of _ ." U.S. Report on the Hague Conference,
supra note 3, at 809.
'" PRACTICAL MANUAL, supra note 3, at 27-28. See Article 9 which provides that the re-
questing authority can specify a particular procedure which must be followed unless incom-
patible with the domestic laws of the state of execution or impossible of performance due to
practical difficulties.
,3, "Every contracting state does agree to accept a letter in either English or French, or
translated into one of those languages, unless the state makes a reservation ... to such ac-
ceptance." Message of the President, supra note 63, at VII. Special provisions are made for
bilingual states.
'u PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 28.
Message of the President, supra note 63, at VII.
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to be informed of both the time and place at which the letter will
be executed. The parties or their representatives may be present
at the execution proceedings.14 Also allowed to attend are the
judges of the court which issued the letter,"' pursuant to the con-
ditions laid down in Article Eight.
The ninth Article is a most important provision. It provides
that the "judicial authority which executes a letter of request
shall apply its own law as to the methods and procedures to be
followed." ' However, while it is easier for the executing court to
apply its own procedures, it will comply with a request of the issu-
ing court that a special method or procedure be followed in order
to ensure maximum utilization of the evidence.4 An executing
court is not required to comply with a special procedural request
if the requested procedure is incompatible with the executing
state's internal law, or is impossible due to internal practice or
procedure or because of practical difficulties. " The legislative
history of the Convention makes it clear that such incom-
patibility4 5 could exist only when the law of the state of execution
imposed a barrier to the special procedure and that "impossible"
does not mean inconvenient.1" Thus, although the standards are
somewhat imprecise, the state of execution can refuse to comply
with a special procedural request only when there is conflict with
internal substantive law (e.g., the constitution or legislation of the
state of execution), or when the internal practice or procedure
makes compliance "truly impossible."'4 7
If followed by the executing state, Article Ten can be a quite
useful provision. Under this article, a recalcitrant witness who
140 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 28.
... U.S. Report on the Hague Conference, supra note 3, at 810.
"' Evidence Convention, supra note 1.
. U.S. Report on the Hague Conference, supra note 3, at 810. Examples of special pro-
cedures include: that the responses be furnished in writing under oath; that a verbatim
transcript be made; that the witness be placed under oath; and that a representative of the
requesting authority be permitted to be present and to participate actively in the pro-
ceedings. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 29.
..4 Message of the President, supra note 63, at VII and 23.
145 Incompatibility means a conflict with a constitutional or legislative provision. US.
Report on the Hague Conference, supra note 3, at 810.
"' Id. at VIII. There was considerable debate on the semantics of this article in an effort
to accurately state the intention of the Convention. There was no desire to create an
"escape clause" through the use of too broad phraseology. There is a clear difference be-
tween "impracticable" and "impossible of performance." The latter phrase is a more dif-
ficult standard to meet in order to avoid complying with the letters of request. This was in-
tentional because the basic intent was to maximize international cooperation and to
minimize the possibilities of refusal to cooperate. Id at 23.
", US. Report on the Hague Conference, supra note 3, at 810-811.
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refuses to appear, or who appears but refuses to furnish the
evidence requested, can be compelled either to appear or to
testify."8 Such an "application of compulsion is not discretionary
with the executing authority," according to the treaty."" The only
limitations are that compulsion be appropriate and that it corre-
spond to the same compulsion which would be enforced in a
similar domestic proceeding in the state of execution. ° If compul-
sion would have been granted in the state of execution under the
same circumstances, then compulsion will be applied in executing
the letter of request. However, no greater level of compulsion
would ever be used in the executing state than that prescribed by
its domestic laws.' 5' It is also possible that the Article Twelve
"sovereignty and security" exception to execution, discussed
below, could limit the applicability of compulsion under Article
Ten. 5
2
Article Eleven of the Convention allows a witness to invoke any
testimonial privilege available to him under either the law of the
requesting state or the state of execution."M If privileges of the
state of execution are recognized, the execution of the letter of re-
quest would, as a result, conform to the requirements of a
domestic proceeding in the executing state. However, in recogniz-
ing privileges which exist in the requesting state two possibilities
can occur. First, the requesting state may indicate the applicable
privilege within the letter of request itself. Second, if this is not
done, the witness may, during the proceedings in the executing
state, make a claim of "foreign privilege" under the law of the re-
questing state.'' The responsibility of raising a claim of privilege
in the latter situation is upon the witness. If he does claim the
privilege of the requesting state's law, the executing authority
will ask the requesting state for a specification of the privilege in
order to certify tat the privilege is valid and one which the state
of execution sho{ild honor.' 5
',' Id. at 811. See Message of the President, supra note 63, at VIII and 25.
" This article uses the mandatory word "shall." Compulsion is appropriate to require
the witness to answer a particular question or to produce certain documents or to permit
entry upon real property for inspection. See Message of the President, supra note 63, at 25.
ISO Id.
151 Id.
52 U.S. Report on the Hague Conference, supra note 3, at 811.
155 PRACTICE MANUAL. supra note 3, at 29. See text at notes 242-248 infra for the use of
the fifth amendment privilege by the English witnesses in the Westinghouse case.
Message of the President, supra note 63, at 26.
' Id. at 26. The Commission recognized that the allowance of "foreign law" privilege
might frustrate execution of the letters of request, since it would be possible for a witness
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Article Twelve permits the executing state to refuse a letter of
request only to the extent that its execution is not within the func-
tion of the judiciary or on the ground that the executing state con-
siders that its sovereignty or security15 would be prejudiced by
the letter's execution. '57 The executing state, however, may not
refuse execution solely on the ground that it claims exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the letter of request or
because the law of the executing state would not recognize a right
of action on the subject.1
In Article Thirteen, the Convention provides for the return of
the executed letter through the same channel as it was originally
transmitted by the requesting authority.159 Finally, Article Four-
teen, along with Articles Twenty-six and Twenty-eight, regulate
the question of costs and fees for the execution of the letter. Ex-
to claim a privilege which was unknown in the state of execution. The Commission felt that
this might lead "to endless arguments over the 'foreign law' "; law with which the executing
state would not be familiar. To minimize such a risk the conference decided to pass the prob-
lem back to the requesting state and allowing it to confine the question of privilege
"within such limits as they might choose." Id. at 26. However, the conference also recognized
that no solution would be completely satisfactory. It is also possible that contracting states
may agree to recognize privileges from a third state. Cf. the U.S. provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782 (1976), which recognizes any "legally" applicable privilege" that would prohibit compul-
sion of the witness. This section provides no clear answer to the recognition of privileges of
various countries -it recognizes them all. U.S. Report on the Hague Conference, supra note
3, at 811.
1 See text at note 152.
Message of the President, supra note 63, at VIII. Under Article Twelve, the Conven-
tion deals with the problem of justification for non-exercise of a letter which does comply
with the Convention's formal requirements, but which otherwise comes within Article
Twelve. An example of a function which does not come within the judiciary power of a
country would be a function which is to be performed by an administrative agency. As far
as an example of an executing state refusing to execute a letter of request because its
sovereignty or security would be prejudiced, there has never been an instance where "this
provision has been the basis of a disagreement between any two states ... nor has it ever
been invoked improperly as an excuse to avoid complying with the Convention." Id. at 27.
Note, too, that without the Convention, American courts seeking evidence in a foreign
country "could rely only on international comity and the goodwill of foreign courts in ex-
ecuting letters rogatory." Thus, the Convention provides a stronger basis upon which to ex-
pect that the foreign court will comply with the letters of request. See Taking Evidence
Abroad, supra note 21, at 381. Cf. the letters rogatory and comity basis alone for its effect
on compliance by the executing state at note 63 supra. Also cf. the Westinghouse case in
which the sovereignty of the United Kingdom was a major reason for noncompliance with
the letters of request, infra note 294.
If execution is refused the executing state is to notify the requesting state providing an
explanation of the reasons. See Article 13 and note 159 infra.
" Id. Under Article 12 there is no question of the formal requirements of the Convention
not having been met. For a failure to comply with the formal requirements of the Evidence
Convention, see Article 5 at note 131 supra.
159 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 29.
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ecution generally does not give rise to reimbursement of any
costs. The basic idea is that the services are to be furnished free
of charge by the state of execution. Nevertheless, any unusual
costs for employing interpreters, experts or other special pro-
cedures under Article Nine may result in assessment of a fee by
the executing state."' 0
2. Chapter Two of the Convention
As indicated previously,"6 ' the second chapter of the Conven-
tion, dealing with the taking of evidence by consular officers and
commissioners, has found more limited application than Chapter
One due to the reservations made by signatories to the Conven-
tion. "Unfortunately, all foreign countries who have ratified the
Convention to date have interposed major reservations with re-
spect to this Chapter.' 62 Nevertheless, a brief overview of the
chapter is warranted, if only for comparison with the similar pro-
cess of taking testimony under the commission process of Federal
Rule 28, discussed above-in Part II.
Article Fifteen allows a diplomatic or consular officer to take
testimony from his own national for use in his country's courts. No
compulsion, however, is permitted. " Under the second part of Ar-
ticle Fifteen, a state may file a declaration requiring the officer in
every case to apply to an authority of that state for permission to
take evidence.'" Article Sixteen provides that, in most cases, a
diplomatic or consular officer may take evidence from persons
who are not nationals of the officer's country only with the con-
sent of the state of execution. " Article Seventeen permits a com-
missioner to take testimony if the state of execution has granted
either general permission or permission in the specific case. It
also allows for the appointment of foreign judges as commis-
sioners of a requesting state's courts, which enables the judges to
directly examine witnesses in their own language and under the
state of execution's procedure.'"
" Id See U.S. Report on the Hague Conference, supra note 3, at 812-15.
. See note 113 supra.
162 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 30. For reservations, which signatories have made
to the Convention see note 113 supra.
'" Cf. the letters of request procedure and the use of compulsion in the text at note 148
supra. To the extent that these provisions have been adopted, American litigants may
utilize the notice and commission methods to take evidence. See Taking Evidence Abroad,
supra note 21, at 384.
'" PRACTICE MANUAL. supra note 3, at 31.
15 Id.
166 Id.
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Article Eighteen gives the state of execution discretion in ap-
plying compulsion to assist a foreign officer in obtaining evidence
from a recalcitrant witness. Article Nineteen authorizes the state
of execution to fix the time and place of the taking of evidence
before a consul or commissioner. The unconditional right of the
persons concerned to be represented by counsel is granted by Ar-
ticle Twenty."7 Article Twenty-one delineates the administrative
rules that apply to a foreign officer taking evidence under the
Convention. Paragraph (d) of this Article is particularly impor-
tant; it permits the taking of evidence under the procedure of the
forum where the action is pending, unless it is forbidden by the
law of the state of execution. 8 Under Article Twenty-two, if the
process of taking evidence through a commissioner or consul fails,
the requesting party may then utilize the letter of request pro-
cedure."9
3. Matters Not Included in the Convention
Several items were not included in the Convention due to policy
differences. No provision is made for free legal aid to the wit-
nesses. The question of the immunity of a witness from arrest or
service of process while attending a hearing in execution of a let-
ter of request was left as a matter to be resolved under the law of
the state of execution. Also excluded was the matter of a witness
refusing to appear and testify before a consul or commissioner.
This, too, was felt to be a matter best left for regulation by the
state of execution. 170
Questions still remain concerning which nation's consuls may
take the testimony of a witness having a dual nationality. Under
Article Sixteen, the state of execution is given the right to decide
who are its nationals. There is also the problem of precisely defin-
ing the term "judicial authority" as it is used in Article One. It is
questionable whether "administrative tribunals" are to be excluded
from the provisions of the Convention. Since no exact definition
has yet been promulgated, each case must be reviewed on its
facts. Finally, there are problems of criminal law which may arise
from attempts to take testimony abroad. For instance, the failure
of a witness to obey an order of the executing state and the giving
of false testimony by a witness raise questions of internal law
"7 Id. at 32.
168 Id.
169 Id.
70 Message of the President, supra note 63, at 41-42.
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regarding criminal sanctions and jurisdiction. The Hague Commis-
sion was of the opinion that these matters were not appropriate
for regulation by the Evidence Convention. 7 '
D. Summary of the Evidence Convention
The Convention establishes minimum standards for interna-
tional judicial assistance and serves to improve the practice of in-
ternational litigation by simplifying, or at least unifying, the
various procedures which may be utilized in obtaining evidence
abroad. The Convention is not as liberal as the current United
States law, but it is a move in the direction toward greater liber-
ality and increased international cooperation. It is unfortunate
that, thus far, only seven of the eighteen signatory states have
ratified the Convention. Apart from the Convention, the only
methods available for obtaining foreign source evidence are those
previously discussed: notice, commission and letters of request
procedures, which are fraught with complex difficulties and inher-
ent delays.
The remaining portion of this paper will present an analysis of
the Westinghouse case. Certainly, the discussion does not exhaust
the background facts of the case. Information concerning the pre-
cise methods used to obtain testimony, the evaluation made of the
letter of request by the English government, the communication
between counsel for Westinghouse and the American government
(if any), and many other important matters which would enable one
to focus more clearly on the process used and counsel's reasons
for their choices, is not available. Nevertheless, one can ascertain
the reaction of the British courts to the letter of request from the
American court. This reaction, as well as the entire judicial pro-
cess involved in execution of the letter of request, illustrates the
difficulties which arise when an effort is made to take testimony
abroad.
IV. THE WESTINGHOUSE URANIUM CASE LITIGATION AND
THE USE OF THE EVIDENCE CONVENTION'S LETTER OF
REQUEST PROCEDURE
There are many interesting aspects to the Westinghouse
Uranium Litigation. However, aside from providing some back-
ground material concerning how the case initially arose, this arti-
cle will concentrate on one particular aspect of the litigation-the
171 Id.
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attempt by Westinghouse to secure documentary evidence and
oral testimony from a British corporation and several individual
British witnesses through the use of the Evidence Convention's
letter of request procedure. Despite the fact that this involves
only a minor aspect of the entire case, it is interesting to consider
that if the evidence had been obtainable, the Westinghouse Cor-
poration might have been able to avoid potential liability of $2
billion and actual liability of approximately $650 million.172 Further-
more, the issue of obtaining evidence in England is not an in-
significant one. Overall there were five judicial opinions rendered
by the English courts, and the time both parties spent seeking
either to enforce or to avoid the execution of the letters of request
was more than a year. Of course, a substantial sum of money was
spent by the parties. The American and British governments also
became involved in the case. If the issue was considered insignifi-
cant, it was not apparent from the importance attached to the case
by everyone involved.
In this section, the facts giving rise to the Westinghouse case
and the need which arose for letters of request will be examined
first. Then a review of the appeals through the lower British
courts will be presented. Finally, the decision of the House of
Lords resolving the matter will be evaluated. This review will
highlight some of the practical difficulties in seeking judicial
assistance under the rules of the Evidence Convention.
A. Factual Background: Why the Letters of Request
Were Used
1. The Uranium Contracts
In 1966, Westinghouse Electric Corporation began contracting
with various electric utility companies for the sale of nuclear reac-
tor power plants."' As part of these contractual agreements with
the utility companies, Westinghouse offered "as a sweetener" to
supply uranium fuel for use in the reactors. 7 ' Westinghouse
sought to make its contracts with the utilities a complete system
package, wherein Wesgtinghouse would supply not only the reac-
tors but also all of the necessary uranium fuel to run them. Such
contractual arrangements were acceptable to many utility com-
panies and, at the time, conditions in the uranium market seemed
172 See note 182 and text infra.
1 Dep't of Justice Memorandum (July 6, 1977), at 2.
174 Bus. WEEK, December 26, 1977, at 33.
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to indicate that Westinghouse would be able to meet easily its
contractual commitments.",5 In fact, Westinghouse did keep its
uranium fuel commitments in line with its actual supplies until
1971.76 Thereafter, however, Westinghouse began contracting to
sell uranium short (i.e., to sell supplies it did not yet own)."' These
supplies were to be delivered to the utility companies at prices
"stated in the contracts, which could be varied only with changes
in the general cost of living, and not with changes in the market
price of uranium." '78 Even though the contract price for yellow
cake uranium was a low $6.00 to $8.00 per pound, Westinghouse
"felt secure" in agreeing to these prices as late as 1974.' ' 9 The
uranium supply situation had only begun to undergo change in
late 1972 when Australia ceased production, and in 1973, when the
Arab oil embargo focused attention on U.S. uranium supplies.'80 It
was also during 1973 that some countries began to emphasize
nuclear power as a means to supply their future electrical needs,
while other countries completely banned the exportation of
uranium fuel. Perhaps as a result of these factors, the price of
uranium doubled to $16.00 per pound.
By 1974 Westinghouse had agreed to supply various electric
utilities with 80 million pounds of uranium at an average price of
$10.00 per pound.' 1 The current world market price of uranium by
that time had reach $42.00 per pound. The company had only 15
million of the 80 million pounds of uranium needed to fulfill its con-
tracts. The cost of obtaining the remaining 65 million pounds was
at least two billion dollars, nearly twice the company's assets of
record at the time.8 2 Faced with such an awesome liability,
Westinghouse announced to the utility companies in September,
Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 6, 1978, § D, at 9, col. 1.
17 Id.
117 In Re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [19771 Queen's Bench
Division, Transcript of the Proceeding before Justice MacKenna, at 3 [hereinafter cited as
Second Appeal]. See [1977] 3 W.L.R. 430 (C.A.).
178 Id.
'" Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 6, 1978, § D, at 9, col. 3.
,sO "The primary effect of the oil embargo was to increase the attractiveness of the
nuclear option (for electricity) relative to oil and gas." Id.
8, TIME, Nov. 21, 1977, at 96.
Is Parisi, Major Settlement is Near in Complex Westinghouse Case, N.Y. Times, Dec.
26, 1977, § C, at 39. [hereinafter cited as Parisi].
"If the company had to buy the 65 million pounds it needs-uranium that it had
agreed to supply the utilities at about $11.00 a pound-it would have to shell out
(with today's price escalators taken into account) at least $2 billion and perhaps
much more. A company accountant recently testified in Richmond that
Westinghouse could lose as much as $3.1 billion by honoring the contracts." Id.
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1975, that it could not deliver the contracted-for uranium, and of-
fered instead to allocate the 15 million pounds it currently owned
among all of the utility companies. The companies refused the of-
fer. Instead, they sued Westinghouse for its failure to deliver the
actual contracted-for amount of uranium.
In lawsuits by the utility companies, Westinghouse claimed as
its defense that under U.C.C. § 2-615,81 it was excused from
performing its contract obligations because of unforeseen cir-
cumstances which made such performance "commercially imprac-
ticable." ' Westinghouse was sued in several courts, but only the
federal court suits filed by thirteen utility companies which were
consolidated in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Richmond Division, under Judge R. Merhige,
Jr., as In Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Con-
tract Litigation'85 are the subject of this review. The results of
this proceeding may have a critical impact upon future litigation
against Westinghouse as well as any other litigation which might
benefit from the production of the evidence sought in the Rich-
mond case.'88
"s U.C.C. § 2-615 (1952 version) provides in pertinent part that:
[E]xcept so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation (a) delay in
delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller ... is not a breach of his
duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made imprac-
ticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made....
The comment to this section says that a seller is excused from delivering goods "where his
performance has become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen circumstances
not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting." This section codifies
the doctrine of commercial impracticability.
For a detailed analysis of the doctrine of impossibility see Posner & Rosenfield, Im-
possibility and Related Doctrines In Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, VI J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 83 (1977). For an economic argument that Westinghouse should not be able to use the
defense of impossibility, see Joshow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market and
the Westinghouse Case, VI J. OF LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977).
See also notes 194 and 200 infra, regarding the plaintiff's charges that Westinghouse
knew of the cartel and, therefore, could not plead impracticability as a defense.
." Second Appeal, supra note 177, at 3. Westinghouse notified the utilities of its inability
to supply the uranium in a letter dated September 8, 1975.
405 F. Supp. 316 (1975) [hereinafter cited as the Richmond Litigation].
1 Aside from the Richmond action, the following litigation was pending in which
Westinghouse was a party:
(1) A suit by three Pennsylvania corporations against Westinghouse, also a
Pennsylvania corporation, in state court. This court issued letters rogatory,
similar to the Richmond case, but the state court action continued with an
eventual settlement of about $6 million. See Parisi, supra note 182, at 39.
(2) A suit by Westinghouse against thirty foreign or domestic corporations
which produce uranium was filed in the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois on October 15, 1976. In this action, Westinghouse alleged a
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2. The Richmond Litigation
At trial, Westinghouse relied upon an affirmative defense based
on the legal doctrine of commercial impracticability under the
U.C.C. Section 2-615. This portion of its defense was based
primarily upon the changed circumstances in the world uranium
market. In addition, Westinghouse alleged that a uranium cartel
existed "whose actions drastically restricted the available supply
of certain fuels, including uranium, and dramatically increased
prices.. .,"" Apparently, Westinghouse first obtained hard
world-wide conspiracy and the formation of a cartel in violation of United
States antitrust laws. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.,
[1976] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at A-3.
Other actions which include similar allegations as those made by Westinghouse in item 2
above, have been initiated by other plaintiffs. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) filed antitrust suits on November 18, 1977, against ten foreign and three U.S. pro-
ducers of uranium. The suits were filed in federal district courts in Chattanooga, Denver
and New York. (TVA is also a party to the suit against Westinghouse filed in Richmond,
Virginia. TVA's suit is against Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation of Great Britain; its U.S. unit Rio
Algom Corporation; Gulf Oil Corporation of Pittsburgh; and eleven other foreign and
domestic corporations). FACTS ON FILE, Nov. 26, 1977, at 895.
In addition United Nuclear Corp. filed suit against General Atomic Co., a 50%-owned
subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation alleging, inter alia, a violation of U.S. antitrust laws.
TIME, Nov. 21, 1977, at 96. United Nuclear found itself in a situation quite similar to
Westinghouse, when the price of uranium rose dramatically from 1972 to 1975. United
Nuclear had agreed to deliver 27 million pounds of uranium at prices ranging from $9.00 to
$14.00 per pound, with the current price at $42.00 per pound on the world market. Id In
this suit, United Nuclear claimed that "Gulf entered into the relatively low-priced contracts
in 1973 and 1974 when it had inside information, gained from its Canadian subsidiary's par-
ticipation in the cartel, that uranium prices would rise steadily in future years." FACTS ON
FILE. Nov. 26, 1977, at 895. Finally, aside from the court proceedings mentioned above, an
investigation was being conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice. This investigation
began in March of 1976 when a Grand Jury was impanelled in the District of Columbia to
aid in the Justice Department's investigation of potential violators of U.S. antitrust laws. In
Re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] Queen's Bench Divi-
sion, Transcript of the Proceedings Before Master Jacob, at 6 [hereinafter cited as First
Appeal].
"I Westj4house alleged the changed circumstances and the existence of a uranium
cartel which manipulated prices in paragraphs four and six of its pleadings, which stated:
Paragraph 4: In the fall of 1973, the Arab oil embargo precipitated a world wide
energy crisis, that radically changed all pre-existing assumptions upon which the
aforementioned contracts or negotiations were based. The availability and price
of certain fuels, including uranium, were thereafter manipulated by the anti-
competitive actions of certain foreign governments, producers and cartels, whose
actions drastically restricted the availability supply of certain fuels, including
uranium, and dramatically increased prices to artificially set levels, many times
the price levels which would have prevailed in a free competitive market.
Paragraph 6: On information and belief, defendant avers that certain uranium
producers, individually and collectively, withdrew from the uranium market and
refused to sell quantities of uranium for the purpose of securing higher prices.
These actions have had a serious impact upon the uranium market, causing a lack
of supply and artificially high prices.
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evidence of a cartel's existence from documents which were
released in California in August 1976, and which were obtained
from the files of an Australian uranium producer.' The cartel in-
cluded uranium producers from France, England, Canada, Aus-
tralia, and South Africa. Rio-Tinto-Zinc (RTZ) Corporation was
one of these producers, as well as its associated company, RTZ
Services Limited. 8 ' Both of these firms are located in Great
Britain, but also include a U.S. unit, Rio Algom Corporation."w The
documents were put before the Richmond court by Westinghouse
as evidence of the cartel's existence. They included minutes of the
cartel's meetings and other documents dealing with the cartel's
activities.'19
Unfortunately for Westinghouse, however, these documents
were by no means complete. The documents had been obtained
"surreptitiously" in Australia,'92 and they were only indicative of
the cartel's wide-ranging activities."98 Because of the need for addi-
'" Westinghouse's claim that a cartel existed was based on evidence which it obtained in
September 1976. An anti-nuclear environmental group, Friends of the Earth, had obtained
documents from an anonymous donor allegedly taken from Mary Kathleen Uranium, Ltd.,
an Australian producer and a subsidiary of Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation. These documents
were made public by the Friends of the Earth and include: "letters, memoranda, and
minutes of meetings which appear to detail the activities of such a cartel." Department of
Justice Memorandum, H.P. Morrison, Jr., July 6, 1977, at 3.
"' Second Appeal, supra note 177, at 5.
IN FACTS ON FILE, supra note 186, at 895.
l0I Second Appeal, supra note 177, at 4.
In Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] 3
W.L.R. 430, 435 (C.A.) [hereinafter cited as Third Appeal].
"' Subsequent to Westinghouse's efforts in this case, Time Magazine reported that a
House subcommittee and a federal grand jury
had turned up documents that tell an amazing tale of market rigging. The
cartel-known as the Club to its members-was organized by the Canadian
government, initially to prevent what in 1972 looked like an imminent drop in the
price of one of Canada's most important export commodities. At the time, the
world supply of uranium exceeded demand by 400%, according to some
estimates, and if newly discovered deposits in Australia had been made available
to the world market, demand would have been unlikely to catch up with supply
until the early 1980's. As it happened, Australia embargoed uranium exports until
last August .... Meanwhile, the cartel swung into operation. TIME, Nov. 21, 1977
at 97-98.
The cartel established a headquarters, policy and operating committees, and it also devised
"detailed rules for dividing up markets and fixing prices." Those rules forbade members to
share markets or rig prices in the member states of France, South Africa, Australia,
Canada and in the non-member U.S., in order to stay clear of local antitrust rules. But
whenever a member company learned of a potential order from an outside country-Japan,
say, or Spain-it had to inform the cartel's secretariat. The cartel would then select a
member to bid at a price it had set; to preserve appearances, another member would be
chosen to bid at a higher price sure to be rejected. Id.
Additional indicates of how the cartel operated include revelations by the House Com-
merce Committee's panel on Oversight and Investigations that the cartel members did in-
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tional and more conclusive evidence in the Richmond litigation
which would improve Westinghouse's affirmative defense,'
Westinghouse wanted to obtain other information regarding the
cartel's manipulation of uranium supplies; however, its attempts to
obtain additional evidence in Australia, Canada, France and South
Africa were not successful. These countries had enacted regula-
tions which forbade the disclosure of any documents concerning
the cartel.195 At this point, Westinghouse sought additional
evidence of cartel activity from the English Corporation, Rio Tinto
Zinc, and some of its officers.'"
B. Procedural Background: Difficulties in Obtaining Compliance
with the Letters Rogatory
1. The Letters Rogatory
In order to obtain evidence for use in its defense, Westinghouse
proceeded under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 28,
which provides for the taking of a deposition in a foreign country
"pursuant to a letter rogatory."' 97 Westinghouse applied to the
tend to have an impact on the U.S. market. Cartel members did sell to U.S. firms using
cartel terms, mentioned in the Time article above, and the cartel had "targeted"
Westinghouse "[a]s a cartel enemy." The cartel had plans to affect the market past 1980.
"Rio Tinto ... is widely believed by close observers of the cartel to have been one of its
principle architects." Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1977, at 4, col. 1.
I" One reason more concrete evidence was required was that the electric utility com-
panies alleged that Westinghouse "... . ought to have been aware of the existence, if not the
activities, of the cartel many years before 1976 ... [and that] ... their contractual obliga-
tions ... were subject to the possibility that ordinary market forces ... would or may not
continue to operate and there might no longer be free competition in this market." Thus,
Westinghouse should have realized that a free market would not continue indefinitely
without some actions by the cartel. Therefore, Westinghouse cannot rely on commercial im-
practicability as a defense. First Appeal, supra note 186, at 7. See note 200 infra.
195 Third Appeal, supra note 192, at 435.
In regard to a disclosure ban imposed by the Canadian Government, the Ontario
Supreme Court ruled on Nov. 10, 1977, that the government could not, at least, "prevent
members of Parliament from discussing the cartel in the House of Commons or disclosing
information on the controversial issue to journalists." However, journalists were not allowed
the right to report such information, and could be prosecuted for disclosure. The Canadian
government said it enacted the non-disclosure regulation to "prevent U.S. government of-
ficials from obtaining documents about participation in the cartel by Canadian subsidiaries
of U.S. companies." But opposition party members said Prime Minister Trudeau "had acted
illegally in September, 1976 in prohibiting the disclosure of any information on the uranium
cartel." "The opposition MPs contended that Canada's involvement in the cartel may have
been illegal because it set export levels for uranium and may have raised uranium prices
within Canada. The opposition MPs claimed the regulation had been enacted by the Cabinet
to cover up the cartel." FACTS ON FILE, Nov. 26, 1977, at 895.
" Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts as Amended,
Effective July 1, 1975. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(3). See the discussion of this procedure begin-
ning at note 59, supra. By proceeding under a letter rogatory, the applicable law was that of
Great Britain, the state of execution. Due to its ratification in 1976, Great Britain is a party
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district court for letters rogatory to take testimony and to obtain
documentary evidence. Their purpose in
.. serving such testimony and documents was designed to con-
firm recently released documents and attendant publicity sug-
gesting the existence and operation of an international con-
spiracy and cartel among uranium producers to raise uranium
prices, to establish uniform terms of sale, to allocate markets,
and to refuse to deal with Westinghouse and other resellers of
uranium. The testimony and documents sought through their ap-
plication will allow Westinghouse to prove not only that its
freedom to purchase uranium at reasonable prices for resale to
its customers was infringed by the cartel, but also that the
cartel's impact spread to the United States and infected the
price and terms of sale offered by U.S. uranium producers. Such
evidence bears an important legal issue in this litigation ....
In its application to Judge Merhige, Westinghouse went on to
clarify the precise reasons for which it sought the depositions and
information from the English Corporation, Rio Tinto Zinc. West-
inghouse said that, although the evidence and information to date
amply demonstrated the existence and operation of the cartel, the
documents did not constitute a complete set of the minutes of the
many meetings held during a five-year period throughout the free
world nor a complete record of the cartel's activities to accomplish
its objectives. Therefore, its application sought to obtain complete
testimonial and documentary proof regarding the "operation of
the international cartel as well as the activities of its constituent
'participating groups' of uranium producers in order to provide
conclusive proof of the effect of the cartel, both outside and inside
the United States, on the price of uranium sales and on the supply
of uranium."'" The electric utilities objected to the issuance of the
letters rogatory, 200 but Judge Merhige issued them, nevertheless,
in October, 1976.201
to the Evidence Convention. See note 104 supra, for a list of parties to the Convention.
'" Application of Westinghouse Electric Corporation for issuance of letters rogatory,
reprinted in Second Appeal, supra note 177, at 10-11.
in Id.
See note 194 supra. The utility companies objected to issuing the letters rogatory
because they felt "it was not a basic assumption of the contracts (with Westinghouse) that
there was no cartel." Therefore, it was said, the information sought by the oral testimony
and the documents was "irrevelant." The plaintiffs also protested the issuance of the letters
because the Evidence Act of 1975 specifically prohibits pre-trial discovery of documents and
England does not generally permit the utilization of pre-trial discovery procedures as used
in the U.S." Second Appeal, supra note 177, at 12. This particular issue of whether the
documents were for use at trial, or were merely pre-trial discovery was an issue on review
by the English court. See notes 72 and 129 supra.
"0, Judge Merhige specifically supplemented the letters rogatory on May 20, 1977, to
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The letters rogatory were then sent to Great Britain, where
orders were issued to have several named individuals examined
and to have the RTZ Company produce certain documents for the
civil proceedings in the Richmond litigation. ' The letters
rogatory stated that in order to achieve justice between the par-
ties in the Richmond litigation, the testimony and documents
relating to the cartel activities of Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation were
needed. They went on to request the English court to "cause by
your proper and usual process (five named individuals associated
with RTZ) to appear before any consul ... of the United States ...
to be examined orally as a witness in the above entitled actions
pending (in the Richmond Court).2 03
make it clear that they were concerned, not with pre-trial discovery, but "for evidence and
documents for actual use at trial." Third Appeal, supra note 192, at 436.
20, First Appeal, supra note 186 at 2.
's The text of the letters rogatory is in part:
The people of the United States of America to the High Court of Justice in
England. Greeting: Whereas certain actions are pending in our District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division in which the corporations [the
electric utility companies] are plaintiffs and Westinghouse Corporation is defen-
dant, and it has been suggested to us that justice cannot be done among the par-
ties without testimony, which is intended to be given in evidence at the trial of
the actions, of the following persons residing in your jurisdiction, being directors
and/or employees and/or former directors and/or former employees of the Rio Tinto
Zinc Corporation Limited of 6 St. James' Square, London or such other director
or other person who has knowledge of the facts as to which evidence is desired as
hereinafter stated, nor without the production of certain documents in the posses-
sion of the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Limited such testimony and such
documents being related to the existence and terms of various agreements, ar-
rangements or concerted practice between Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Limited
and the following entities as well as others whose identities are presently
unknown: . . . RTZ Services, Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation (U.S.), Rio Algom
Limited (Can.) . . . . (Other Australian and South African companies are also
named). . . . (A)nd whereas the existence and terms of such agreements, ar-
rangements or concerted practices are relevant to the matters in issue in the ac-
tions at present in this court. We, therefore, request that in the interests of
justice, you cause by your proper and usual process [five named individuals] or
other person having knowledge of the facts to appear before any consul or vice
consul or other consular officer to the United States of America at London, at a
time and place to be determined, then and there to be examined orally as a
witness in the above entitled actions pending in this court, under oath (or solemn
affirmation) upon such oral questions as shall be propounded by ... attorneys for
the defendants, and upon such cross questions as shall be propounded by any ...
(attorney) representing the plaintiffs relating to the existence and terms of the
above mentioned agreements or concerted practices. We further request that you
cause the said Rio Tinto Corporation Limited by its proper officer to appear at
the time and place determined for the above oral examination, then and there to
produce documents ... which appear to be in the possession, custody or power of
the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Limited.
First Appeal, supra note 186, at 8.
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The letters rogatory were given effect in England on October
28, 1976, in an ex parte action by Master Creightmore "ordering
that the individuals named do attend and submit to be examined,
and that the companies named do produce certain documents re-
quired for certain civil proceedings in America."2 "4 The English
subjects sought to have the letters rogatory orders set aside or, in
the alternative, to have the court, in its discretion, refuse to comply
with the American court's request or to assist Westinghouse in its
efforts."5 The first appeal by RTZ was before Master Jacob, who
held that the RTZ objections to complying with the letters
rogatory were insufficient and, therefore, the orders of Master
Creightmore were to be complied with by the Rio Tinto Zinc Com-
pany and its officials.2°"
2. The English Court of Appeals Decisions
A discussion of the English Court opinions which were handed
down after the letters were transmitted to England can be more
easily understood by reference to the chronological table set out
in the footnote. 2°7 At the First Appeal, RTZ sought to have the
First Appeal, supra note 186, at 2.
Ild. at 2.
Id. at 1.
Chronology of events:
October 21, 1976
Letters Rogatory were issued by Judge Merhige in Richmond
October 28, 1976
In England, Master Creightmore's ex parte order gave effect to the letters.
February 22, 1977
First Appeal by RTZ to set aside the order was dismissed.
May 10, 1977
Second Appeal resulted in affirmance of the decision in the First Appeal.
May 20, 1977
Judge Merhige supplemented the letters rogatory to make it clear that they were concerned
with evidence to be used at trial.
May 26, 1977
Third Appeal affirmed the lower court decisions which gave effect to the letters rogatory,
but allowed for claims of privilege. Some modification of the list of documents which could
be discovered was made.
June 8, 1977
At the execution of the letters, the witnesses claimed the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
June 13, 1977
Judge Merhige traveled to London and ruled that the fifth amendment privilege was prop-
erly invoked. To obtain testimony immunity would have to be granted.
June 15, 1977
The Department of Justice sent a memorandum to Judge Merhige stating the need for the
testimony of the RTZ witnesses.
June 27, 1977
The British government delivered an Aide Memoire protesting the "intervention" of the
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order upholding the letters rogatory set aside because the request
was an attempt to obtain pre-trial discovery which is prohibited
under English law."0 8 After discussing several arguments, the
court held:
(1) oral testimony from the RTZ officials should be given under
the terms of the letters rogatory;
U.S. government in private civil litigation.
July 6, 1977
U.S. Department of Justice refuted the British contention that it was "intervening" in
private litigation.
July 7, 1977
An appeal by Westinghouse to disallow the privilege claim by RTZ was denied by the
English court, which upheld the Third Appeal decision.
July 12, 1977
Attorney General Bell's letter supported the granting of immunity in order to obtain the
testimony of the witnesses.
July 18, 1977
Immunity was granted by Judge Merhige under U.S.C. §6002.
July 21, 1977
RTZ's counsel wrote to the Crown indicating the matters which may be stated in evidence,
if the witnesses were re-examined after the immunity grant.
July 25, 1977
RTZ applied. for a stay of the orders in the Third Appeal which would require oral
testimony of the individual witnesses. The stay was refused by the court.
July 25, 1977
The RTZ executives again refused to testify and an appeal was taken to the House of
Lords.
December 1, 1977
The House of Lords issued its opinion.
"I See note 130 supra concerning Article 23 of the Evidence Convention and the English
desire to avoid honoring letters of request which seek pre-trial discovery. No doubt the
situation is problematic, unless the requesting courts procedures are used as a deciding fac-
tor. Otherwise, no adequate definition of pre-trial discovery can serve every case. Thus, as
in the Westinghouse litigation, it is largely a matter of court discretion to determine if the
evidence sought is to be used at trial or whether it is only serving pre-trial discovery pur-
poses. In the First Appeal, the judge was satisifed that Westinghouse wanted the oral
testimony of the RTZ officials and the company's documentary evidence "for adducing
evidence at trial and not for merely discovering facts which may not be used at trial." First
Appeal, supra note 186, at 15. Cf. the more liberal allowance for obtaining evidence under
the Federal Rules at note 91 supra. See also the older English cases, prior to the Evidence
Convention, which forbade allowing pre-trial discovery or "fishing expeditions" under the
1856 Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act: Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp. 2 W.L.R.
281, affd 1 Q.B. 618 (1956) and American Express Warehousing v. Doe, 1 Lloyd's List L.R.
222 (C.A. 1967). The 1856 Act was superceded by the Evidence (Proceedings in Other
Jurisdictions) Act of 1975 which gave effect to the Evidence Convention in the United
Kingdom. See notes 219 and 221 infra.
' The judge stated: "in a matter involving such world-wide importance as the establish-
ment of a club or cartel to control the supply and prices of uranium, it is inconceivable that
the managing director, chairman, or deputy chairman should not be aware of what [was]
happening." These people should have "material evidence which they can give in relation to
the issue of relating to the existence and activities of the cartel." First Appeal, supra note
186, at 18.
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(2) documentary evidence relating to the cartel's meetings was
not pre-trial discovery and would be used at trial and, therefore, it
was obtainable under the letters; 10
(3) the RTZ claim of a privilege because of the penalty provi-
sions of Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome was not sufficiently im-
minent to allow this privilege to defeat the letters... and "the
claim to privilege on the ground of self-incrimination [did] not ap-
ply" to the corporation;1 and,
(4) the fifth amendment claim of privilege by the individual
witnesses was a "question to question" claim and could not be in-
voked prior to the asking of the questions pursuant to the letters
rogatory.2 1 In short, the letters were to be complied with accord-
ing to the privilege guidelines indicated.
The First Appeal framed the three major issues of the case in this
manner: whether the letters were to be given effect under English
law; whether the RTZ company could invoke a privilege against
turning over any documents because it would be subject to a
penalty under the Treaty of Rome and whether the individual
witnesses (officers of the RTZ company) could invoke the fifth
amendment privilege of the United States Constitution against
self-incrimination.214
The decision in the Second Appeal, concerning the initial order
giving effect to the letters rogatory, was handed down on May 10,
1977.211 The Second Appeal affirmed the decision of the court in
the First Appeal. 2 '6 Afterwards, RTZ filed yet another appeal to
211 Id. at 16.
See notes 227-234 infra.
212 First Appeal, supra note 186, at 24.
2' Id. at 25. The testimony could in effect be taken but the U.S. court would have to rule
on the validity of any fifth amendment privilege. Claims of privilege had to be decided on a
question by question basis. Of course, if upheld, no evidence by way of oral testimony could
be obtained. See note 155 supra which indicates that the Evidence Convention provides for
the recognition of such privileges. See also note 219 infra for the English Evidence Act pro-
visions which control this procedure.
2.. First Appeal, supra note 186.
... See note 177 supra.
2 1 As it was, Justice MacKenna in the Second Appeal ruled for Westinghouse on every
point raised by the Rio Tinto counsel. But the judge's ruling affirming the decisions below
and requiring compliance with the letters rogatory was diminished by his statement that he
would have reversed judgment if he had more time, and that he had dealt inadequately
with the obligations of Rio Tinto's counsel. Part of the time constraint which existed was
due to the August deadline which Judge Merhige had set for the Richmond litigation to
reconvene after the taking of depositions under the letters rogatory,
The points on which Justice MacKenna in the Second Appeal had ruled in favor of
Westinghouse were:
(1) that Westinghouse had established its reasons for obtaining the letters rogatory be-
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avoid testifying or producing documents for use in the Richmond
litigation.
The Third Appeal was decided May 26, 1977.17 The court
primarily considered the question of allowing Westinghouse the
opportunity to obtain evidence which might be for pre-trial
discovery or in the nature of a "fishing expedition." '18 The court
was faced with a case of first impression, because the controlling
legislation, the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act
of 1975,19 had not been interpreted by a higher court, at least as
fore the Richmond court, and that those persons named in the letters would have
"evidence to give about the restrictive activities of the cartel,"
(2) that although there might be some question about the use of the testimony under the
letters rogatory, "Westinghouse did not ask Judge Merhige to request an examination
for the obtaining of indirectly relevant evidence." The letters sought to obtain "directly
relevant" evidence which was to be used at trial and Westinghouse could not and
would not use the examinations for obtaining indirect evidence,
(3) that based on item 2, the English courts will not be assisting the Richmond court in
pre-trial discovery,
(4) a witness who was compelled to answer in the letters rogatory examination would not
be incriminating himself because his testimony could not be used to his jeopardy in
England. "The witness's involvement in the cartel would not expose him to any liabil-
ity in our courts, civil or criminal." Furthermore, no new privilege should be invented
to protect the Corporation, which in either England or the U.S. had no privilege against
self-incrimination,
(5) that a privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to statements by employees
who incriminate the corporation, and
(6) that the companies should produce the documents pursuant to the letters rogatory
and, therefore, the company's present or former directors will be required also to
answer questions in relation to such documents.
27 See note 192 supra. This case is briefly reviewed in 13 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 370 (1978).
See note 208 supra regarding pre-trial discovery.
"' Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, the Public General Acts and
Synod Measures, Vol. 2, C. 34, 23 & 24 Elizabeth 2, 1975. The Act provides that in Civil Pro-
ceedings (1b) evidence may be obtained through the English courts, and that an order under
this law ". . . shall not require a person ... to produce any documents other than particular
documents specified in the order .... (2,4,b). The Act also provides, in pertinent part, that:
§3(1). A person shall not be compelled ... to give any evidence which he could not
be compellbd to give-
(a) in civil proceedings .. .in the United Kingdom;
(b) Subject to subsection (2) below, in civil proceedings in the country or territory
in which the requesting court exercise jurisdiction.
§3(2). Subsection (1)(b) above shall not apply unless the claim of the person in
question to be exempt from giving the evidence is either:
(a) supported by a statement contained in the request ... or,
(b) conceded by the applicant for the order;
and where such a claim made by any person is not supported or conceded ... he
may ...be required to give the evidence to which the claim relates, but that
evidence shall not be transmitted to the requesting court if that court, on the
matter being referred to upholds the claim.
See note 213 supra and note 236 infra. See also the House of Lords opinion, note 245 infra,
at 3, which gave effect to the letters of request, but which continued to object to the pre-
trial discovery element of the situation.
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far as the provisions relevant to this case. At the outset, the
judges stated "there are no regulations in England forbidding ac-
cess to (the Rio Tinto) documents" and that "disclosure of them
depends on our ordinary rules of law.""0 The first principle enun-
ciated by the Court of Appeals was that English law did not re-
quire them to "accede to anything in the nature of a roving en-
quiry in which a party sought to 'fish-out' something." It was
thought that pre-trial discovery was of this nature. 221 But the court
held that "so long as the evidence is required for use in civil pro-
ceedings" the request of the Richmond court would be granted,
"provided that the evidence is relevant to the issues in dispute in
the foreign court." 2  The Court of Appeals relied upon Judge
Merhige's statement that the evidence would be used in the
American trial,"5 and upheld the order giving effect to the letters
of request with modifications. '
' Third Appeal, supra note 192, at 436. Also note that Judge Merhige had by this time
supplemented the request for the letters rogatory by stating that the information (evidence
and documents) obtained would be "not merely for pre-trial procedure" but for "actual use
at the trial." Id. at 436.
221 Id at 436. See Radio Corporation, note 208 supra. In the First Appeal Master Jacob
had already ruled that the Westinghouse request did not violate English law, and the
evidence was, in fact, to be used at trial. "In the present case there are a whole series of
factors which, taken together or even separately, demonstrate that the oral evidence which
is required by Westinghouse from the witnesses who are named is intended to be adduced
as evidence at the trial for trial purposes. This was made clear on the application for the
letters rogatory themselves .... This was made clear in unmistakable and in the clearest
possible terms by Mr. Bingham (counsel for Westinghouse) before me when he said that as
far as necessary he would undertake to adduce the totality of the evidence taken from the
witnesses in England at the trial before the American courts .... What more can the ap-
plicants for the order do? [Tihey have demonstrated in some detail how it is they propose to
use this evidence, in the sense of adducing it at the trial." First Appeal, supra note 186, at
16.
According to English law "evidence" means evidence to be adduced at trial and not for
discovery by way of a pre-trial process. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act
1975 Section 1. Thus, the broad pre-trial discovery procedure of FED. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32,
and its use at trial in whole or in part, conflict to some extent with the English requirement
of use at trial. Id. See notes 208 and 219 supra.
' Third Appeal, supra note 192 at 437. The Court of Appeal referred to American Ex-
press Warehousing Ltd. v. Doe, 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 222 (1967) as valid precedent for comply-
ing with the letters rogatory. In American Express the English court upheld the request of
an American court for evidence to be taken from some English brokers. The English deci-
sion relied upon the statement by the American judge that such evidence would, at least,
be considered at trial and a final ruling given on its admissibility at that time.
See notes 220 and 221 supra.
22 The court did modify the letter of request compliance order so as to allow discovery of
only those documents which were specified with such distinctiveness as would be sufficient
for a subpoena duces tecum. However, the documents discovered did not have to be an-
cillary to oral testimony. "The description (of the documents) should be sufficiently specific
to enable the person to put his hand on the documents or the file without himself having to
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The Court of Appeal next turned to the problem of self-
incrimination and the existence of any privilege with regard to
the evidence requested in the letters rogatory. English law, as a
matter of precedent, did not require a person to answer if such
reply will make him liable for "punishment, penalty, or
forfeiture." 5 The English Civil Evidence Act of 1968 abolished
the privilege in regard to a forfeiture. But the 1968 Act expressly
retained the privilege in regard to a penalty. "The right of a per-
son in any legal proceeding (other than criminal proceedings) to
refuse to answer any question or produce any document or thing
if to do so would tend to expose that person to proceedings for an
offence or for the recovery of a penalty . . . shall apply only as
regards criminal offenses under the law of any part of the United
Kingdom and penalties provided for by such law."m
In order to establish the benefit of this privilege and to avoid
complying with the letters rogatory, the RTZ Company relied on
the penalty provisions of the Treaty of Rome.' Under English
law prior to this Treaty, none of the RTZ witnesses "would be
liable to a penalty."21 But since the Treaty of Rome was adopted
by Great Britain in 1972, all of its provisions are part of the
British law.m Article 85 of the Treaty, according to the Court of
Appeal, "is wide enough to prohibit any cartel or association of
producers by which they agree to keep up prices or to limit com-
petition in a way which affects the Common Market."10 Thus, if
make a random search-in short, to specifically know what to look for." Third Appeal,
supra note 192, at 438.
22 Id. "It is one of the inveterate principles of English law that a party cannot be compel-
led to discover that which, if answered would tend to subject him to any punishment, penalty
or forfeiture ... 'no one is bound to incriminate himself'." Lord Justice Bowen (1891) quoted
in Comet Products v. Hawkex Plastics, 2 Q.B. 773 (1971).
2 Civil Evidence Act 1968, The Public General Acts, Vol. 2, C. 64, §14, The same
privilege would also apply to letters rogatory under the 1975 Evidence (Proceedings in
Other Jurisdictions) Act, c. 34, §3(1)(a).
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
2' Third Appeal, supra note 192, at 439-40.
The European Communities Act of 1972 incorporates the Treaty of Rome into English
law. Id. European Communities Act 1972, The Public General Acts, Vol. 3, C. 68, §2.
200 The Treaty states that:
all agreements between undertakings . . . and concerted practices which affect
trade between member states and which have as their object or effect the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market, and in
particular those which (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or
any other trading conditions; (b limit or control production, markets, technical
developments, or investments ... are prohibited. Article 85, §1, Treaty of Rome,
supra note 227.
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Westinghouse was correct in its allegations," 1 Rio Tinto Zinc Cor-
poration would be liable for a breach of Article 85 of the Treaty of
Rome."2 For such a breach the European Commission" could im-
pose fines on undertakings (not individuals) which intentionally
violated Article 85. Such fines have a maximum limit of 10 percent
of the preceding business year's turnover. 3 Therefore, it was
clear that RTZ "[might] be exposed to a very large fine by the
European Commission," and such fine was, indeed, a penalty. 3 '
The court held that, because of this potential penalty, the RTZ com-
pany would be entitled to a claim of privilege during the examina-
tion. "If the company does claim privilege, the examiner must give
affect to it."23 RTZ would have an absolute privilege, in this regard,
2' The allegations could include, at a minimum, that a world-wide cartel did exist which
violated some aspects of Article 85 within the Common Market. See note 234, infra. See
generally R. FOLSOM, CORPORATE COMPETITION LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1978);
W. ALEXANDER, THE EEC RULES OF COMPETITION (1973); C. OBERDORFER, COMMON MARKET
CARTEL LAW (2nd Ed. 1971); and A. CAMPBELL, RESTRICTIVE TRADING AGREEMENTS IN THE
COMMON MARKET (1964), especially the forward by Lord Diplock, one of the law-lords who
decided the Westinghouse case. Lord Diplock states: "it is no exaggeration to say that no
one, whether inside or outside the common market, can prudently enter into business rela-
tions with a competitor . . . without informing himself about the provisions of this new
Code." For additional consideration of Art. 85 and 86 of the European Economic Community
Treaty, see STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 3, at 1342-48. The same text discusses the am-
bivalence of the Common Market when it comes to allowing some agreements among com-
peting firms at pp. 1414-19. See also Korah, Interpretation and Application of Article 86 of
the Treaty of Rome: Abuse of a Dominant Position Within the Common Market, 53 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 768 (1978).
22 Third Appeal, supra note 192 at 440.
3 The European Commission is the executive branch of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC). It is composed of 13 members who are appointed on the basis of their com-
petence and independence by mutual agreement of the governments of the Member States.
The four largest Member States-France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom-have
two commissioners each, and the other Member States have one each. A. PARRY & S.
HARDY, EEC LAW (1973).
23 Third Appeal, supra note 192, at 440. The primary basis for breach of Article 85 by
RTZ was its alleged agreements with a French company to restrict competition and fix sell-
ing prices. This activity "would affect the trade between member states." Id.
236 Id.
23 Id. Section 3 of the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 provides:
"A person shall not be compelled by virtue of an order under Section 2 above to give any
evidence which he could not be compelled to give (a) in civil proceedings in the part of the
United Kingdom in which the Court that made the order exercises jurisdiction." See note
219 supra. It has been suggested that foreign courts are reluctant to allow the discovery of
evidence beyond that material to be used for trial, because of U.S. efforts to apply its anti-
trust laws and Maritime Commission regulations extraterritorially. This problem of exten-
sion of U.S. jurisdiction could be settled by use of the comity principle, but according to a
recent article, U.S. courts have been deficient in showing "respect for the reserved domain
of other states .... Maechling, Uncle Sam's Long Arm, 63 A.B.A.J. 372, 373 (1977). See
note 294, infra. For the historical background to the English reluctance to countenance
"fishing expeditions", see the English cases arising prior to the 1975 Evidence Act and the
1980] OBTAINING INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 149
unless the European Commission stipulated that it would not take
any action. In such case the privilege would be lost. 3 '
Next, the individual RTZ officials relied upon the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination provided in the United
States Constitution in order to avoid complying with the letters
rogatory. '38 The English Evidence Act of 1975 states that "a per-
son shall not be compelled to give evidence which he could not be
compelled to give in civil proceedings in the country or territory
in which the requesting court exercises jurisdiction."2 39 Since the
RTZ witnesses would be entitled to the privilege against self-
incrimination in the United States, they could not be compelled to
testify under the letters rogatory.24 Thus, the court gave effect to
the recent English law which had been enacted in order to adopt
the Evidence Convention in England. The court said that any
refusal to testify, based upon either the threat of a penalty from
the European Commission or the fifth amendment, could be
judicially reviewed by a court. In the former case, the English
court would review such refusal. In the latter, "the examiner will
... take down the evidence, seal it up and send it across to the
United States; and then the United States court will rule whether
the claim is good or not." '
In summary, the Court of Appeals held that both the RTZ Com-
pany and its officials were required to provide the evidence re-
quested by the letters rogatory. This requirement was subject to
the defense of privilege, however. The RTZ Company successfully
claimed that it was privileged under the British Civil Evidence
Act of 1968 because of possible subjection to penalty under the
Treaty of Rome. The individual officials were held privileged
under the English Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions)
Ratification of the Evidence Convention in note 208 supra. See also Re Raychem Corp. v.
Canusa Coating Sys., Inc., (1971), 14 D.L.R.2d 684 and National Telefilm Associates v.
United Artist's Corp. (1958) 14 D.L.R.2d 343. See generally STEINER & VAGHTS, supra note
3, at 986-1002; P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (1974) at 123-31; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTL OPERATIONS (1977); Fugate, The Department of Justice Anti-
trust Guide for International Operations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 645 (1977) and Smit, Interna-
tional Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1031, 1048 (1961). See text at
note 81 supra regarding the reach of U.S. criminal jurisdiction.
... Third Appeal, supra note 192, at 441.
" U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .. "
.3 Third Appeal, supra note 192, at 441. See note 219 supra.
240 Id.
"' Id. But see note 219 supra, which says the evidence would not be transmitted to the
requesting court, until it ruled on the privilege issues.
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Act of 1975 because they would have been accorded the fifth
amendment privilege in United States courts. This decision com-
ports with the requirements of the Evidence Convention, which
permits the exercise of privileges under the law of the state of ex-
ecution and the law of the requesting state.
3. Procedural Matters and Government Differences
After the Court of Appeals decision in the Third Appeal was
handed down, an attempt was made to take the testimony of the
witnesses in London on June 8 and 10, 1977.242 However, the
witnesses claimed privilege and refused to answer or to supply
any documents (except six) under both the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution and the English Civil Evidence
Act.2"' On June 13, Judge Merhige went to London to review the
question of fifth amendment privilege. He heard the RTZ
witnesses and all of them claimed the fifth amendment privilege. 24
On June 14, Judge Merhige ruled that "the privilege was well
taken and that the witnesses need answer no questions except to
give their names and addresses. 45
On June 15, 1977, a "Memorandum in Support of Request to Re-
quire Testimony" was sent to Judge Merhige by the Antitrust
Division of the United States Department of Justice.2 6 This
memorandum expressed the necessity of obtaining, in the public
interest, the testimony of those named in the letters rogatory for
purposes of aiding a Federal Grand Jury investigation.247 The
Department of Justice was prepared to grant immunity to the
RTZ witnesses and, in fact, by July 18, 1977, it made application to
Judge Merhige to issue a grant of immunity in order to compel
the testimony of the RTZ witnesses.4 8 Prior to Judge Merhige's
..2 The proceedings were held at the U.S. Embassy in London.
24. See text at notes 241-42 supra.
241 Washington Post, July 26, 1977, § A, at 20, col. 1.
245 In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81
(H.L.). Transcript of the Opinion, at 6. [Hereinafter cited as House of Lords].
M Department of Justice Memorandum, W.B. Cummings, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of Virginia and several attorneys from the Antitrust Division, June 15, 1977,
Memorandum in Support of Request to Require Testimony [Hereinafter cited as Dep't of
Justice Memorandum].
247 Id. at 2. See note 186 supra. The Dep't of Justice was investigating possible violations
of U.S. antitrust law, and a grand jury had been impanelled in March, 1976. See note 67
supra.
.4. House of Lords, supra note 245, at 6. A grant of immunity by the U.S. in response to
the English witnesses invocation of the fifth amendment is appropriate under Article 11 of
the Evidence Convention. See notes and text at notes 153-55 supra. The actual basis for a
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order granting immunity on July 18, 1977, there was a flurry of
diplomatic activity between the British government and the State
Department.24 Then, on July 12, 1977, the Attorney General
grant of immunity and the appropriate procedure is determined by 18 U.S.C. §§6002-6003
(1976). These sections provide in pertinent part:
§ 6002 Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to (1) A court ... of the United States ... and the person
presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order
issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the
order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testi-
mony or other information compelled under the order . . .may be used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for per-
jury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the
order.
§ 6003 Court and Grand Jury proceedings
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary
to a court of the United States ..... the United States district court
for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held
shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the
request of the United States Attorney General for such district, an
order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other
information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, such an order to become effec-
tive as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States Attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney
General .... request an order under subsection (a) of this section
when in his judgment (1) the testimony or other information from
such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and (2) such
individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.
"Although immunity grants pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sections 6002-6003 have typically been
issued to obtain Grand Jury or trial testimony which the Government seeks directly, there
is no prohibition against obtaining such orders in a civil case, United States v. Cappetto,
502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), nor is there any requirement that the Government be a party
to the proceeding." Dep't of Justice Memorandum, supra note 246, at 3. Many federal court
decisions have also supported the notion that the Government has an inherent right and
power to grant immunity regardless of statute. See e.g., United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d
426, (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Librack, 536 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
De Sena, 490 F.2d 692 (2nd Cir. 1973); United States v. Levy, 153 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1946);
and In re Kelly, 350 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
249 On June 27, 1977, the British Government delivered an Aide Memoire to the State
Department protesting the alleged "intervention" of the Department of Justice in the let-
ters rogatory proceedings of the Richmond litigation. The Aide Memoire is a classified
document and was unavailable for study. On July 6, 1977, the Department of Justice
responded to the Aide Memoire. In part, the reply memorandum denied the British conten-
tion that the Department's grant of immunity undermined the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad because immunity was granted to obtain evidence, not in a civil
matter as required by the convention, but to improve the prospects of the grand jury in-
vestigation (a criminal proceeding). The Department of Justice's reply also states that the
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of the United States wrote to the United States Attorney for
the Eastern District of Virginia concurring in the orders to com-
peltestimony. The Attorney General felt that the exceptional cir-
cumstances of the case required the Department of Justice to
support the compulsion of testimony by granting immunity.250 It
was said that the case was one of public interest, the deponents
were outside the personal jurisdiction of the United States, they
were unlikely to enter the United States and there is no other ar-
rangement for obtaining their testimony which "may well be in-
dispensible to the work of the grand jury." '' Finally, on July 18,
Judge Merhige granted immunity to the witnesses pursuant to
the Department of Justice's request under 18 U.S.C. Section 6002.
At the hearing for the grant of immunity, counsel for the RTZ
witnesses reiterated that there was still "an outstanding right of
appeal to the House of Lords in relation to the whole basis of the
letters rogatory."'25 Judge Merhige was uncertain of the response
of the RTZ witnesses, but felt that if they continued to refuse to
testify "application would have to be made to the British Court
seeking sanctions to compel testimony.'253
Immediately after Judge Merhige's grant of immunity, the RTZ
witnesses wrote to the British Foreign Office suggesting that "the
matters of primary concern are the affect of relations with foreign
governments, because there are no less than four foreign govern-
ments involved."2 "4 At this point, the RTZ attorneys were seeking
letters rogatory were upheld in all three appeals before the English courts. See text at
notes 219-240, supra. The reply said, "a full review of the issues was made at each level of
appeal, and at each level these summonses ordering the RTZ deponents to appear pursuant
to the letters rogatory were upheld." The memorandum also clarifies the Department of
Justice's role in granting immunity; which was not intervention but compliance with ap-
plicable U.S. law. Furthermore, the three British courts recognized the role to be played by
the Justice Department should the fifth amendment be invoked. Nor was it a violation of
the Hague Convention which expressly reserves to the authorities of the requesting state
the resolution of privilege claims based on the law of the representing state the resolution
of privilege claims based on the law of the representing state. See note 88 supra. Finally,
the Dep't of Justice Memorandum stated that the existence of grand jury proceedings had
no bearing upon the letters rogatory proceedings. "The English law is that if evidence is ob-
tained in one action, there is no reason why it should not be used in another." First Appeal,
supra note 186, at 26. See note 268 infra.
250 Letter from Attorney General Griffith B. Bell to William B. Cummings, July 12, 1977.
251 Id. The grand jury had been impanelled by the Justice Dep't, note 247 supra.
52 Transcript of Pretrial Hearing, In Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium
Contract Litigation, July 18, 1977, Richmond Va., at 91.
25 Id. at 92. Compulsion is provided for in the Evidence Convention, see text at notes
148-51 supra.
" RTZ, Application for Stay of Execution of Orders, Court of Appeal, July 25, 1977, at
14. [Hereinafter cited as Application for Stay]. The quoted passage was testimony by Mr.
Gibson who appeared before the Court of Appeal on behalf of the Attorney General of the
United Kingdom.
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a stay in the execution of the orders requiring testimony, which
had been upheld in the Third Appeal on May 26, 1977. '55 In
arguments before the same judges who had previously upheld the
orders, Mr. Neill, counsel for the individual RTZ witnesses, stressed
that there was no longer a privilege available under the fifth
amendment2 because of the immunity grant and that the taking
of the depositions was to proceed subject to the application cur-
rently before the Court.257 Raising four arguments, Mr. Neill asked
the judge "to look at the matter afresh," because a "new situation
had *arisen."' 8 First, Mr. Neill sought to appeal to the House of
Lords on the matter of the Court's order in the Third Appeal re-
quiring compliance with the letters rogatory.25 9 Second, he sought
to raise a new situation; namely, what he called the intervention
of the United States Department of Justice.'0 He said that based
on the Attorney General's letter, the letters rogatory procedure
was being used for a different purpose than what was argued
before the court in the Third Appeal on May 26, 1977.261 However,
Mr. Neill had a difficult time expressing any substantial change in
circumstances between the situation in May and the situation in
July following the grant of immunity. 2 His third argument for a
stay was that the House of Lords should rule on these matters
255 See-text at notes 220-241 supra.
25 Application for Stay, supra note 254, at 4.
, Id. at 5.
258 1&
, Id. To this remark that Mr. Neill sought to challenge the basic notion of the carrying
out of the letters rogatory, which had been upheld in three appeals, including one before
the current justices, Lord Justice Roskill replied: "You want to say that everybody was
wrong, the Master, Mr. Justice MacKenna, and we?" Mr. Neill replied, "Yes." Id. at 5. Mr.
Neill then went on to express his arguments for attacking the letters rogatory themselves,
because the RTZ witnesses had not anticipated, or at least felt it unlikely, that the grant of
immunity would be issued thus effectively destroying what had heretofore been the
privilege against self-incrimination.
26 Id. at 7,'Mr. Neill read Attorney General Bell's letter to the judges. See text at note
254 for the main items upon which Mr. Bell felt that granting immunity was justified in this
case.
262 At the earlier hearing on May 26, 1977, the Court of Appeals upheld the order requir-
ing testimony under the letters rogatory because such testimony was to be used at the trial
in Richmond.
262 Lord Justice Roskill said:
Is it accurate, with respect, to talk of the letters rogatory being used for different
purposes. All that has happened is that one source of objection to giving evidence
has been withdrawn. The purpose of the letters rogatory was to inform Judge
Merhige's Court in Virginia. The fact that the Department of Justice may be moved
to grant immunity, because of what one might call wider public policy and con-
sideration to the United States, cannot affect the purpose of the letters rogatory,
surely?
Application for Stay, supra note 254, at 8.
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before the examination of the witnesses took place, otherwise any
privilege which the witnesses might have had would be "rendered
nugatory."2 ' Finally, Mr. Neill brought up the question of the
British Government's position in the matter. He referred to the
Aide Memoire 2 ' which stressed the so-called intervention of the
Department of Justice in the case when it granted immunity
under 18 U.S.C. Section 6002."1 Mr. Neill then sought, on the basis
of these arguments, to obtain a short stay in the examination of
the RTZ witnesses until the House of Lords could hear the case in
October, 1977."6
At the hearing Mr. Gibson appeared on behalf of the Attorney
General of the United Kindgom. He argued in favor of the grant of
a stay based on the United States Government's use of the
evidence for the purposes of Grand Jury proceedings."67 He at-
tempted to make the point that the United States had violated the
Evidence Convention (or that there was some question, at any
rate, concerning its compliance with the Convention).!"8 Therefore,
he concluded, the whole matter should be pursued via diplomatic
channels to its ultimate resolution." He said that the British
"' Id. at 9. The RTZ counsel apparently feared that the evidence once obtained would be
sent to the United States with the U.S. Court ruling on its use at trial. See note 241 supra.
"' See note 249 supra.
..5 See note 248 supra.
Application for Stay, supra note 254, at 10.
, Id. at 11. But see notes 249 and 262 supra.
The main problem concerning the Hague Convention involves the use of obtained
evidence in a criminal proceeding. The British Attorney General argued that evidence ob-
tained can only be used in civil or commercial matters. And that it would undermine the
purpose of the convention to allow the United States to use the evidence at the Grand Jury
hearings. See note 249 supra. The Department of Justice's response to this argument was:
The nature of the British protest indicates that the Foreign Office is reading a
'specialty' clause into the Hague Convention, necessarily limiting the use of
evidence only to the specific purpose for which it was obtained. But unlike certain
other treaties between the United States and Her Majesty's Government, the
Hague Convention contains no such clause. Such a provision was intentionally
omitted because few countries have the means or the willingness to guarantee
that evidence of public record obtained through standardized procedures would
never be used in another proceeding. Because the Convention envisions requests
from judicial authorities at all levels, the task of controlling the later dissemina-
tion of evidence obtained on the public record in one proceeding would simply be
unmanageable.
Dep't of Justice Memorandum, supra note 181, at 13. The memorandum also noted that the
"procedural character of the matter" was not altered by the immunity grant to advance the
civil case. Id. at 14. Furthermore, the Convention's purpose was to improve procedures for
taking evidence in foreign jurisdictions, seeking to accommodate, as Lord Roskill noted in
the Court of Appeal, "the different methods which (the Parties) use for this purpose."
..9 Application for Stay, supra note 254 at 12. Diplomatic resolution of difficulties is pro-
vided for in the Evidence Convention.
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Government wanted to consult with the American Government
"with a view to trying to persuade the American Government that
its action in applying for (the letters rogatory order) was, in fact,
wrong; that they should not have applied for the order at all and
that an application should be made to withdraw the order.""27 This
was the highest level upon which the English Attorney General's
representative could put the argument to the Court. 7' The overall
preference of the British Government was to have the House of
Lords hear the matter and render a decision based on these new
arguments .272
The judges were still unconvinced that these recent argu-
ments actually affected the underlying validity of the letters
rogatory in this case. 73 To clarify the situation, Mr. Gibson
brought to their attention the letter from RTZ counsel, Mr. Neill,
to the Crown, which indicated that certain matters were likely to
be given as oral evidence if the RTZ witnesses were re-examined.
Commenting on this letter, Mr. Gibson said, "There is a possibil-
ity, I put it no higher, that questions of public interest privilege
will arise on that evidence.""74 The judge then inquired whether it
was, indeed, contrary to the public interest for the evidence to be
given. Mr. Gibson responded that there could arise a privilege in
that regard. The judges concluded that "[e]ven though it is be-
tween other parties, the Crown could claim a privilege with
regard to documents.""27 It must be emphasized here that the
public interest privilege referred to by the judges was that of the
United Kingdom, not the parties to the litigation. As Mr. Gibson
pointed out, the "matters of primary concern were the effect of
relations with foreign governments, because there are no less
than four foreign governments involved."2 6 Thus, Mr. Gibson was
270 Id. See note 268 supra for the United States view of the letters rogatory.
27 1&
272 Id. at 13. Mr. Gibson said: "What we do not wish is that by the time the matter comes
to the House of Lords the evidence will have been taken and gone to be used and available
for the criminal proceedings and then it is too late."
,, Id. See note 221 and accompanying text.
Id. at 14.
275 Id.
" Id. After Mr. Gibson's testimony, "it became apparent that the government (English)
might become more deeply involved. The Foreign Office said: 'This intervention has been
made in order that the government should have time to consider a number of aspects of
possible public interest bearing on the case."' THE TIMES, July 26, 1977. The foreign govern-
ments involved were: Australia, Canada, France, and South Africa. These governments put
"strong diplomatic pressure on Britain for it to prevent RTZ from being forced to testify."
Previously, Australia and Canada had enacted laws to prevent their own companies from
testifying so as to avoid providing evidence to the grand jury. See note 196 supra. The
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successful in convincing the judges that, on grounds of possible
public interest privilege, there might be just cause for hearing the
case anew.
Counsel for Westinghouse reiterated that all of the English
courts knew that the Department of Justice antitrust investiga-
tion was being pursued and that all three lower courts had upheld
the letters rogatory. All of the arguments heard in the previous
decision were reviewed by the Westinghouse counsel. It was fur-
ther pointed out that the Evidence (Proceedings in other Jurisdic-
tions) Act 1975 provided a means by which the public interest and
concerns about foreign governments could be reviewed.277
Paragraph 4147 of the 1975 Evidence Act states that "a person
shall not be compelled ...to give any evidence if his doing so
would be prejudicial to the security of the United Kingdom and a
certificate signed by or on behalf of the Secretary of State
(British) to the effect that it would be so prejudicial for that per-
son to do so, shall be conclusive evidence of that fact." '278 Because
this procedure exists, there should be no reason to compel an
answer, provided the Secretary of State (British) agrees that the
witnesses' testimony will adversely affect the security of the
United Kingdom. Thus, there is no need to further delay the
depositions from the RTZ witnesses because of any "nebulous
grounds" which are being raised at this late time.279 Further-
more, these "new reasons" for denying the effect of the letters
rogatory because, in the words of the Aide Memoire, "of the
Department of Justice's intervention" are groundless. First of all,
"it is not new, because the courts have known about the Grand
Jury all along," and second, "it is not a reason for requiring the
evidence, it is the reason which has led the United States
authorities to grant the immunity.""2
After considering these arguments, the Court of Appeal refused
to grant a stay and said "the examination must proceed this after-
noon" (July 25, 1977). The judges felt that "if an appeal was to be
taken to the House of Lords it ought to have been taken long
French company allegedly involved in the cartel is a quasi-governmental body. "South
Africa already had stringent laws which strictly limit what can be divulged about the coun-
try's uranium operations." Id.
7 Application for Stay, supra note 244, at 20. Mr. Bingham, counsel for Westinghouse,
also referred to the intervention of the British Attorney General as unnecessary and uncalled
for on the basis of the 1975 Act.
"' Id. Cf. the Evidence Convention provision of a similar nature discussed in the text at
notes 157-58, supra.
"' Id. at 21.
280 Id. at 22. See notes 238, 239 supra, for further elaboration of these points.
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ago." 8' Later that afternoon, the Rio Rinto Zinc executives refused
to testify"2 and applied to the House of Lords for a stay, pending
the full hearing of their appeal. '88 There remained no more bar-
riers to requiring the oral testimony other than an adverse deci-
sion by the House of Lords. This, however, was no longer a simple
letters rogatory procedure; the stature of the case had changed.
The United Kingdom's Attorney General had intervened in the
case; matters of public interest and relations with four foreign
governments had become issues. Furthermore, the RTZ Cor-
poration was the last element available to Westinghouse, at least
in this action, for uncovering the details and arrangements of the
cartel's activities against them, since it was the one major com-
pany which had been alleged to belong to the cartel but which had
not been protected by a government decree.28 '
C. The House of Lords Decision
The House of Lords rendered its decision on December 1,
1977.1 5 Lord Wilberforce wrote the lead opinion for the five
justices, all of whom agreed in the result. The House of Lords
agreed with the opinion of the Court of Appeal that the RTZ Cor-
poration could claim a privilege under the Civil Evidence Act of
1968 because of the penalty which might be imposed under the
Treaty of Rome. 88 The Lords also upheld the Court of Appeal rul-
ing that the individual witnesses could claim a privilege against
self-incrimination under the fifth amendment.287 These holdings
2I Id. at 29.
282 Washington Post, July 26, 1977, § A, at 20, col. 1. The hearing was before a consular
officer at the U.S. Embassy, and two RTZ executives again refused to testify. The ex-
ecutives were Kenneth Bayliss and Andrew Buxton. They justified their refusal on the
grounds that the British government had taken an interest in the proceedings.
113 THE TIMES, July 26, 1977.
88 The representations made by the four foreign governments were that "if RTZ were
not protected their own actions would be nullified." Id. See notes 193 and 276 supra.
28. An indication of the extent of which the issue of government involvement in the case
had become the paramount concern of the House of Lords is the reporting of their decision
by the local press:
An attempt by the United States Attorney General from British subjects for the
purpose of an investigation into possible criminal violations of United States anti-
trust laws, after those persons had obtained a ruling from a United States judge
that they could rely on the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
by declining in civil proceedings to give evidence which might incriminate them
was castigated by the House of Lords as an unacceptable invasion of United
Kingdom sovereignty.28
THE TIMES, July 26, 1977 (emphasis added).
288 See text at note 239, supra.
28' See text at note 238-241, supra.
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virtually mirrored the Court of Appeal decision. Also upheld was
the original order of Master Creightmore of October 28, 1976,
which, in fact, had given effect to the letters rogatory.288
Despite the foregoing holdings, however, the House of Lords
went on to hold that the letters rogatory should not be given ef-
fect regarding the witnesses. The House of Lords first reviewed
several issues, such as: the process by which the RTZ witnesses
were first ordered to testify; how they next claimed the self-
incrimination privilege of the fifth amendment; Judge Merhige's
upholding of their claim; the letters concerning immunity from the
Justice Department's application to Judge Merhige to grant im-
munity; and, finally, Judge Merhige's order compelling the
English subjects to testify. Following their review, the House of
Lords reversed the rulings of the Courts of Appeal, relying on
two arguments: (1) that Judge Merhige's ruling recognizing the
fifth amendment privilege was a "considered ruling in law" which
should be reviewed very carefully when "action is said to negative
that ruling"; and (2) that the testimony being sought was really to
be used, not in the Richmond litigation, which was a civil pro-
ceeding, but in the Justice Department's Grand Jury investiga-
tion, which "may lead to criminal proceedings.'29
These two arguments do not lead inevitably to the Lords'
holding. Considering the first argument, Lord Wilberforce stated
that Judge Merhige's ruling on the fifth amendment privilege
''was given by the competent judicial authority that the evidence
sought was evidence which the witnesses could not be compelled
to give in civil proceedings in the country in which the requesting
court exercises jurisdiction."' It was said of the ruling that it was
''necessary to look very carefully at action which is said to
negative that ruling.""1 Thus far, the House of Lords opinion ap-
peared consistent with the Evidence Convention regarding
assistance on letters rogatory.
The "action which is said to negative" Judge Merhige's fifth
amendment ruling was the subject of Lord Wilberforce's second
argument. It should be recalled that what prompted Judge
Merhige's order to compel testimony, despite his recognition of
the fifth amendment privilege, was the grant of immunity he
House of Lords, supra note 245 at 5.
"' Id. See text at notes 246-252 detailing the immunity grant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§
6002, 6003 (1976).
'" House of Lords, supra note 245, at 8 (Emphasis added).
Id at 5.
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made at the request of the Justice Department. Apparently the
House of Lords believed that the Justice Department involvment
on the immunity issue so changed the "character and purpose" of
the Judge's order to compel testimony that the letter of request
could not fall within the provisions of the Evidence Convention.
The Lords believed that the United States Government's letters
of June 15 (the memorandum from the Antitrust Division) 2 and of
July 12 (the Attorney General's letter)"3 made it clear that "[t]he
evidence to obtain which the order was made and the immunity
granted was on the face of these documents evidence required for
the Grand Jury investigation set up by the United States Depart-
ment of Justice, Antitrust Division."" The position of the House
of Lords, that the Justice Department's involvement in the case
created a "new situation" changing the nature of the letters of re-
quest, had been rejected earlier by the Court of Appeals. "
Since the Grand Jury investigation could lead to criminal pro-
ceedings, it was held, the letters rogatory should not be given ef-
fect, because the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions)
Act of 1975 (which implemented the Evidence Convention) limited
such procedures to civil cases. Furthermore, the House of Lords
held, even if this case fell within the provisions allowing restricted
use of letters rogatory in criminal matters, the letters must be
pursuant to proceedings which had been instituted. None had
been instituted at that time."6 Thus, the opinion of the House of
Lords posed a seemingly inescapable dilemma for Westinghouse:
either the letters rogatory were issued to obtain evidence for a
criminal proceeding, in which case they would not have effect
because they were not for a civil proceeding, or, if they fell within
2 See note 247 supra
,, See text at notes 250-51 supra.
' House of Lords, supra note 235, at 8.
,, See text at notes 259-280 supra and the contrasting arguments of Mr. Neill, the RTZ
counsel, and Mr. Gibson, the Westinghouse counsel.
" House of Lords, supra note 235, at 8. The pertinent provisions of the Evidence (Pro-
ceeding in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975, supra note 219, are as follows:
§ 1(b) that the evidence to which the application relates is to be obtained for the
purposes of civil proceedings which either have been instituted before
the requesting court or whose institution before that court is contem-
plated ...
§ 5(1) The provisions of sections 1 to 3 above shall have effect in relation to the
obtaining of evidence for the purposes of criminal proceedings as they
have effect in relation to the obtaining of evidence for the purposes of civil
proceedings except that-
(b) paragraph (b) of that section shall apply only to proceedings which
have been instituted...
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the limited provision for criminal cases, no such proceeding had
begun.
The important point here, aside from the curious reasoning of
the House of Lords, is that the Lords assumed that the Justice
Department involvement in the case transformed it from a civil to
a criminal case, thereby precluding effective use of the letters. In-
terestingly, Lord Wilberforce did not review the Court of
Appeal's previous refusal to grant a stay in the proceedings; that
court had expressly rejected the very arguments concerning
United States government involvement which the House of Lords
ultimately accepted."1
The motive behind the House of Lord's first two arguments
becomes clearer upon a review of their concluding argument. Lord
Wilberforce discussed the "infringement of United Kingdom
sovereignty" which occurred because of the efforts of the United
States "to extend the Grand Jury investigation extra-territorially
into the activities of the RTZ Companies." 8 The opinion stated
[t]hat the Grand Jury [had] issued a subpoena to Westinghouse
requiring that company to produce to the Grand Jury
documents and testimony obtained in discovery in the Virginia
Proceedings. Therefore evidence given in pursuance of the let-
ters rogatory will be available to the United States Government
for use against a United Kingdom company and the United
Kingdom nationals in relation to activities occurring outside
United States territory in antitrust proceedings of a penal
character." 9
Although the evidence taken from the RTZ Companies and from
the witnesses could ultimately be used in a criminal proceeding, it
does not necessarily follow that the United States government
27 See text at notes 259-280 supra.
House of Lords, supra note 245, at 8. The British papers editorialized: "the expan-
sionary ambitions of U.S. agencies have been checked. It is to be hoped that this approach
will be more effective than others in securing that "comity" between the interests of dif-
ferent governments which has been endangered by the U.S. approach .... The findings of
the House of Lords may have a more direct and general effect on the attitude of the U.S.
courts to matters of sovereignty: Those who work in a tradition of common law tend to
respect one another's decisions." Financial Times, Dec. 2, 1977, at 22.
The editorial also expressed repugnance at the idea that the U.S. courts and Federal
regulatory agencies tried to "enforce their authority on foreign nationals transacting
business outside the U.S., if their business is thought likely to have economic effects inside
the U.S." One other area of a notable clash between the U.S. and other governments is in
the operations of the Federal Maritime Commission in relation to foreign shipping con-
ferences. Id. See note 236 supra.
M House of Lords, supra note 245, at 8-9.
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would, in fact, bring a civil or a criminal antitrust action. The prin-
cipal reason for the House of Lords holding seems to be a disdain
for the extra-territorial application of United States antitrust
laws. In a display of candor Lord Wilberforce declared: "[it is ax-
iomatic that in antitrust matters the policy of one state may be to
defend what it is the policy of another state to attack. ' 00 Thus,
due to the perceived involvement of the United States Govern-
ment in the Westinghouse case, the House of Lords refused to
give effect to the letters rogatory.
D. Conclusion
The opinion of Lord Wilberforce failed to review the basis for
the intervention of the British Government. The Lords did not
consider that the interest shown in the case could have been the
result of the requests of the governments of other countries who
might have been implicated in the cartel's activities. Nor did the
Lord's opinion attempt to clarify the fact that through the three
appeals in the lower courts, plus the refusal by the Court of Ap-
peals to grant a stay, each decision upheld the validity of the let-
ters rogatory, even though the courts were aware of additional
proceedings then occurring in the United States. Furthermore,
these courts were also aware of the Department of Justice's
Grand Jury investigation when they made their decisions. The
Court of Appeal was aware of the letters from the Department of
Justice and the Attorney General when it refused to grant a stay
in the letters rogatory proceedings. Perhaps it would be requiring
too much, in the face of extreme political pressure, to ask the House
of Lords to assess more carefully the logic of the preceding opin-
ions.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the House of Lords took no in-
terest in the/ ossible losses to British citizens which may have
resulted frorfi the manipulation of uranium supplies and prices.
The lower courts felt that the RTZ Company might be subject to
rather severe penalties under the Treaty of Rome provisions.
Thus, whereas the lower courts perceived the alleged manipulative
practices of RTZ as detrimental, to some extent, to England and the
European Economic Community, the House of Lords chose to
disregard this impact.
The final effects of the House of Lords ruling are not precisely
quantifiable. It is likely that Westinghouse's hope of obtaining ad-
I at 9.
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ditional information from RTZ delayed its efforts to settle with
the United States utility companies." 1 Westinghouse has settled a
few suits out of court, and it hoped to offer its services, equipment
and cash in suitable amounts to settle the remaining suits.
However, many of the utilities in the Richmond litigation involved
large claims and would be difficult to settle. In any event, Judge
Merhige urged the officials of the utilities and Westinghouse "to
renew their stymied efforts to compromise before he had to
render what might be an all-or-nothing decision. 'o2
Another interesting question, which also remains unresolved, is
what foreign source evidence will be available, if any, in the other
suits now pending in the United States. °3 Will the government or
other plaintiffs have any opportunity to obtain evidence abroad
which would help to establish participation by American firms in
the cartel? If not, the adverse effect which the lack of such evi-
dence would cause must be seen as, at least, a partial failure of
the Hague Evidence Convention. Yet these are extraordinary
cases, in that they involve not only private litigants, but also the
actions of governments. In such cases, the procedural re-
quirements of the Evidence Convention may become secondary to
governmental interests. Perhaps in cases where the policy in-
terests of governments are less at stake, the procedures of the
Evidence Convention can be utilized successfully to serve the
cause of justice in the courts of a particular country by providing
a clear and effective process of international judicial assistance.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
After reviewing both the specific legal procedures for obtaining
evidence abroad and their attempted utilization by Westinghouse,
one becomes well aware of the complexities which may accompany
efforts to obtain foreign source evidence for use in the United
States. The review of the various methods for obtaining evidence
abroad encompassed non-treaty means, such as deposition by
stipulation, by notice, and by commission; and the recent treaty on
this subject, the Hague Evidence Convention on Civil or Commer-
cial Matters, with emphasis on the letters rogatory procedures.
301 Wall St. J., June 2, 1978, at 36 col. 1.
302 1&
' See note 186 supra. The suit by Westinghouse against the thirty foreign and domestic
uranium producers has been delayed until Sept. 1981. Judge Marshall ordered the contin-
uance because a number of the defendants could not be ready for trial as originally planned.
Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 3, 1979, § D, at 13, col. 1.
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The Evidence Convention presents standardized procedures for
obtaining foreign source evidence, thereby eliminating many of
the problems found with non-treaty methods. In addition, since
the Convention imposes a treaty obligation upon the signatory
states, evidence gathering pursuant to it should be less subject to
the vissicitudes of traditional international law notions such as
comity.
The extensive Westinghouse litigation undertaken to obtain
evidence from British subjects demonstrates one limit to the Con-
vention's usefulness: when a state raises governmental policy
issues in what should be fairly straightforward procedural mat-
ters. The British courts provided some early interpretations of
several key provisions of the Convention relating to letters
rogatory. They upheld the validity of the letters rogatory pro-
cedures and applied rules regarding the recognition of privilege
claims. In the end, however, the House of Lords, under heavy
political pressure, refused to give effect to the letters on the
grounds of United States Government involvement in the case.
The Westinghouse case shows, then, that letters of request pro-
cedures, even when undertaken pursuant to the Evidence Conven-
tion, may become unreliable when there is governmental involve-
ment in litigation. This can occur even when, as in the Westing-
house case, governments get involved tangentally.
The important question which remains for the practitioner, then,
is whether the Evidence Convention can be utilized effectively in
a case where such important national policy issues do not arise.
This article has suggested that it can be so used. If used success-
fully, there is no doubt that the Evidence Convention will foster
increased international judicial cooperation and result in more
effective enforcement of international business agreements.
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